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Abstract 
 
Researchers agree that comprehenders regularly predict upcoming language, but they do not 
always agree on what prediction is (and how to differentiate it from integration) or what 
constitutes evidence for it. After defining prediction, we show that it occurs at all linguistic 
levels from semantics to form, and then propose a theory of which mechanisms 
comprehenders use to predict.  We argue that they most effectively predict using their 
production system (i.e., prediction-by-production): They covertly imitate the linguistic form 
of the speaker’s utterance and construct a representation of the underlying communicative 
intention. Comprehenders can then run this intention through their own production system to 
prepare the predicted utterance. But doing so takes time and resources, and comprehenders 
vary in the extent of preparation, with many groups of comprehenders (non-native speakers, 
illiterates, children, and older adults) using it less than typical native young adults.  We thus 
argue that prediction-by-production is an optional mechanism, which is augmented by 
mechanisms based on association. Support for our proposal comes from many areas of 
research (electrophysiological, eye-tracking, and behavioral studies of reading, spoken 
language processing in the context of visual environments, speech processing, and dialogue). 
 
Keywords: dialogue; language comprehension; language production; prediction. 
 
Public significance statement. 
This theoretical review shows that people regularly predict upcoming language. Importantly, 
it also shows that in most cases people rely on their own ability to produce language to make 
predictions that are compatible with both the speaker’s language and their intended message. 
This form of prediction aids, but it is not necessary for, language understanding.   
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What Does it Mean to Predict During Language Comprehension?  (1) 
 
 Traditionally, most cognitive and perceptual psychology assumes that people deal 
with the world as they encounter it.  More recently, however, researchers have proposed that 
the brain’s fundamental computations are prediction and assessment of those predictions (A. 
Clark, 2013). Hence people may continuously use context to predict how the world might be 
and then compare these predictions with what they subsequently encounter. People are 
therefore as prepared as they can be for the stimuli that are likely to occur, and the benefit 
from getting predictions right most of the time may outweigh any difficulty from 
occasionally getting them wrong.   
 There is now extensive evidence that prediction is important for language 
comprehension, just as it is for perception and cognition more generally.  In this paper, we 
propose an integrated theory of the mechanism of prediction during language comprehension 
(Section 2). We then use this theory as a guide to conduct a systematic review of the 
experimental evidence, across domains and methodologies, including electrophysiology, eye 
movements, speech, and dialogue (Section 3). Finally, we discuss broader implications of our 
proposal (Section 4). The central claim of the theory is that comprehenders predict with 
mechanisms that are used for producing language – and because the predictions that 
comprehenders make using these mechanisms are similar to those that they would make if 
they were producing themselves, the predictions tend to be accurate and successful. These 
mechanisms are not always used, but comprehenders can always fall back on general-purpose 
associative mechanisms.  
In Section 1 we first discuss what it means to predict language. We start by asking to 
what extent language is predictable (1.1), and then go on to distinguish prediction from 
integration, both in the context of experimental work (1.2) and in the context of 
computational accounts of language processing (1.3). Finally, we set out methodological 
criteria that studies must meet in order to demonstrate prediction (1.4).  
 
How predictable is language? (1.1).  
For at least 40 years, it has been clear that people interpret language extremely 
rapidly. Comprehenders do not delay a word, phrase, or sentence before performing lexical 
access, parsing, and semantic analysis.  In fact, they analyze each word as they encounter it 
and integrate it with prior context in a highly incremental fashion. In one of the first 
demonstrations of incrementality, Marslen-Wilson (1973) had participants shadow speech 
and found that their errors were determined by the prior context, even when they lagged little 
more than 250ms behind the speech that they heard.  This finding suggests that they were not 
just repeating what they heard, but were immediately trying to combine it with previous 
context. In reading, Just and Carpenter (1980) found evidence for lexical, syntactic, and 
semantic processing as soon as a word was fixated.  Similarly, Swinney (1979) showed that 
listeners used context to select the appropriate meaning of lexically ambiguous words (e.g., 
bat) within a few hundred milliseconds.  When syntax is ambiguous, people also rapidly 
select or favor a syntactic analysis during both reading (e.g., Frazier & Rayner, 1982; 
Trueswell, Tanenhaus, & Garnsey, 1994) and listening (e.g., Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, 
Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995). Such incrementality means that comprehenders may sometimes 
adopt an analysis that turns out to be incorrect, but importantly it enables comprehenders to 
process linguistic input much more rapidly than would otherwise be possible.   
But in fact people may comprehend even faster than is suggested by the evidence for 
incrementality.  They may not only analyze each word as they encounter it, but also predict 
what they are going to encounter. Traditionally many researchers argued against prediction 
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and instead assumed “bottom-up priority” (e.g., Forster, 1979; Marslen-Wilson, 1987). One 
major criticism of the prediction view was simply that most words are not predictable. 
Predictability was (and is) typically assessed by asking people to complete a sentence 
context, using the so-called Cloze procedure (Taylor, 1953)1; if most people produce the 
same completion, the context is deemed predictive or constraining and this completion highly 
predictable or high-Cloze (with alternative completions being low-Cloze).  But most naturally 
occurring contexts are not highly predictive or constraining, with people providing many 
different completions (i.e., they are medium- to low-Cloze).  Therefore prediction appeared to 
have a very limited value, and researchers assumed either that it never occurs or that it occurs 
only in unusual contexts (e.g., Stanovich & West, 1979).  Hence, it would not be 
characteristic of language comprehension in general.  
 It is true that very few words are highly predictable (e.g., Luke & Christianson, 2016), 
but many words are moderately predictable.  Moreover, language involves grammar, sounds, 
and meaning, and one or more of these may be predictable even if the word itself is not.  For 
example, consider (1): 
 
1. The boy went out to the park to fly a kite. 
 
People may not be able to predict fly, but they can be fairly confident that the upcoming word 
will be a verb.  They may not be able to predict that the boy went to the park, but could 
predict that he must have gone into a sufficiently large place, such as a shop or a beach.  So 
even if people do not regularly predict words, they might predict some aspects of language.  
Moreover, the traditional argument against prediction depends on isolated utterances.  But 
dialogue involves extensive repetition (Garrod & Anderson, 1987) and predictable sequences 
(e.g., question-answer pairs; Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974), and so may support 
prediction to a greater extent than isolated language.  In conclusion, traditional 
psycholinguistics underestimated the predictability of language and may also have 
underestimated how often prediction actually occurs. 
 
Prediction versus integration (1.2).  
So far, we have discussed the predictability of language, but in order to define what it 
means for a comprehender to predict, we must contrast prediction with integration.  
Theoretically, prediction occurs if a comprehender activates linguistic information before 
processing input that carries that information.  We use pre-activation to refer to the 
information that is activated predictively.  In (1), kite is highly predictable after a.  If people 
predict kite, they must pre-activate some component of its linguistic representation, such as 
the sound /k/ or conceptual feature +FLYABLE, before they could have done so on the basis 
of encountering kite (e.g., while reading fly a). Pre-activation of course goes beyond simply 
building up an appropriate contextual representation; for example building up a 
representation for the article a does not in itself imply pre-activation of a consonant sound.2    
The benefits of successful prediction are made clear by the notion of pre-activation.  
When comprehenders predict successfully, they pre-activate representations that they use 
                                                 
1 Throughout the paper, we report mean Cloze values when available, though note that 
studies vary on their precise instructions (e.g., use the most natural, the most plausible, or the 
first completion that comes to mind; Staub, Grant, Astheimer, & Cohen, 2015) and 
assessment criteria (e.g., e.g., whether singular and plural responses are collapsed). 
 
2 Note that we do not use the terms expectation or anticipation, which appear to be used in 
slightly different ways in the literature, and are not necessary for our account.  
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when they actually encounter the predicted input.  Such pre-activation therefore allows them 
to perform some of the processing ahead of time, and therefore explains how prediction 
facilitates comprehension. 
In contrast, integration occurs when a comprehender combines linguistic information 
that is activated as a result of processing the input, with a representation of the preceding 
input (i.e., the context).  In (1), a comprehender would integrate kite by processing it and thus 
deriving linguistic representations (e.g., +FLYABLE), and then combining these 
representations with a representation of the prior context up to fly a.  As integration does not 
involve pre-activation, it does not facilitate comprehension in the same way and all of the 
processing needs to occur bottom-up. 
It can be very difficult to distinguish prediction from integration, and in particular to 
find evidence that is compatible with prediction but not integration.  Much research 
demonstrates that people are faster at processing a more predictable than an unpredictable 
word.  For example, Schwanenflugel and Shoben (1985) found that people made faster 
lexical decisions to highly predictable words (the tired mother gave her dirty child a bath) 
than less predictable words (the tired mother gave her dirty child a shower), even though the 
sentences were equally plausible and the words did not differ in frequency.  In an ERP study, 
Kutas and Hillyard (1984) presented participants with target words that were more or less 
predictable given the context and showed that the amplitude of the N400 (a negative-going 
wave peaking around 400ms after word onset) was inversely related to predictability.  
Finally, using eye-tracking Ehrlich and Rayner (1981) found that readers fixated predictable 
words for less time than unpredictable words and were more likely not to fixate on a 
predictable word at all.  All of these predictability effects have been extensively replicated, 
and are of course compatible with the evidence for incremental interpretation discussed in 
Section 1.1 (e.g., Marslen-Wilson, 1973). 
Importantly, while we acknowledge that most of these findings could be due to 
prediction, they could also be due to integration. If people predict kite in (1), they pre-activate 
aspects of its linguistic representation, and therefore will find it easier to process the word 
than an unpredictable alternative such as airplane when they encounter it.  If they do not 
predict kite, they may still find it easier to process kite than airplane, but in this case the 
facilitation would be because it is easier to integrate kite than airplane with the context, and 
not because of pre-activation.  Under this integration interpretation, before encountering kite, 
comprehenders would of course activate properties of the context that are relevant to kite 
(e.g., that it describes a flying event involving a boy as agent) but crucially they would not 
pre-activate aspects of the linguistic representation of kite.  Instead, they only activate those 
aspects when they encounter kite and it is only then that they are facilitated, because it is 
easier to combine the meaning of kite with the context (as opposed to the meaning of a 
different word, such as airplane).   
As a rather different example, contextual effects on the perception of speech sounds 
can also be due to prediction or integration.  English listeners tend to categorize a sound 
“halfway” between /s/ and /ʃ/ as /s/ if it follows tremendou- and as /ʃ/ if it follows repleni- 
(Samuel, 2001). It is possible that they accessed the lexical entry for tremendous or replenish 
by this point, and therefore pre-activated /s/ or /ʃ/ before they encountered the ambiguous 
sound.  The pre-activated phoneme then affected their perception of the ambiguous sound. 
But it is also possible that listeners did not pre-activate the final phoneme of the lexical entry.  
When they encountered the ambiguous sound, they categorized it in a way that made it easier 
to integrate with the preceding context, but without predicting the missing sound (e.g., Norris, 
McQueen, & Cutler, 2000).  Indeed, some related effects must be due to integration because 
they are caused by disambiguating information following, rather than preceding, the 
ambiguous sound (Ganong, 1980). 
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Finally, consider associative priming (D. E. Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971), for 
example the reduced N400 effects on queen after king (Bentin, McCarthy, & Wood, 1985; 
Rugg, 1985), and phonological priming, as in facilitation for thing after king (Praamstra & 
Stegeman, 1993; see also Slowiaczek, Nusbaum, & Pisoni, 1987).  The traditional account of 
such effects involves activation spreading from the representation of the prime word to 
representations of associatively (or semantically) or phonologically related words.  Recent 
researchers have (appropriately, in our view) characterized this explanation as predictive 
(e.g., Lau, Holcomb, & Kuperberg, 2013; McRae, Hare, Elman, & Ferretti, 2005).  But an 
integration-based account of such findings, with people responding to queen quickly after 
king because king-queen is an appropriate (because associatively related) combination, is also 
possible.  This account is reminiscent of compound-cue theories of priming, in which 
facilitation for queen after king occurs because the king-queen compound is retrieved easily 
from memory (Dosher & Rosedale, 1989; Ratcliff & McKoon, 1988).  
 
Suprisal and entropy. (1.3)  
As well as in the experimental evidence we have just considered in Section 1.2, we 
see another manifestation of the tension between prediction and integration in the notions of 
surprisal and entropy, which are incorporated in many computational models of language 
processing. As discussed by Hale (2001) and Levy (2008), the surprisal of a word is the 
negative logarithm of its conditional probability, that is the probability that the word will 
occur given the preceding context. To give an example, the word kite has a lower surprisal 
than airplane following fly in (1).   Typically, this probability is derived from a large corpus, 
and how exactly the context is defined can vary. As such, surprisal represents a way of 
measuring predictability that is an alternative to the Cloze task – low surprisal corresponds to 
high Cloze, and high surprisal corresponds to low Cloze. 
Accordingly, words with higher surprisal are harder to process than words with lower 
surprisal, for example leading to longer eye fixations and self-paced reading time (N. J. Smith 
& Levy, 2013) and increased N400 effects in ERP studies (Frank, Otten, Galli, & Vigliocco, 
2015). Surprisal can also be defined over syntactic categories or structures (e.g., the 
probability of a noun or a sentential complement), and again higher surprisal leads to more 
processing difficulty (e.g., Linzen & Jaeger, 2016).  But such findings do not demonstrate 
prediction, any more than do Ehrlich and Rayner (1981), Kutas and Hillyard (1984), or 
Schwanenflugel and Shoben (1985): They are compatible with prediction, but they are also 
fully compatible with an integration account in which low-surprisal words are easily 
integrated with context. Finally, although the relationship between surprisal and processing 
difficulty suggests that surprisal may constitute a good formalization of predictability (and 
may therefore be seen as part of a “computational-level” description in Marr’s [1982] terms), 
there is also some evidence that measures of comprehension relate more closely to measures 
of predictability based on cloze values (N. J. Smith & Levy, 2011).  
The entropy of a context is a measure of the degree of uncertainty about how it will 
continue (and is defined as −∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖 log 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖, where 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 is the probability of continuation 𝑖𝑖).  The 
entropy is higher for contexts that are compatible with more equiprobable continuations than 
fewer equiprobable continuations, and is higher for contexts with equiprobable continuations 
than contexts with continuations that differ in probability from one another (but have the 
same number of continuations).  Roughly speaking, a high-Cloze context has low entropy, 
whereas a low-Cloze context has high entropy.  Like surprisal, entropy can be defined with 
respect to words or, for example, syntactic categories or structures. 
Unlike effects of surprisal, effects of entropy on processing of the context would 
provide strong evidence for prediction because, by definition, they occur before the 
predictable word.  If people read low-entropy contexts faster than high-entropy contexts, it 
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would suggest that they predicted possible continuations differently in the two types of 
context (e.g., they had difficulty predicting a large range of unlikely continuations).  In an 
fMRI study of narrative comprehension, Willems, Frank, Nijhoff, Hagoort, and Van den 
Bosch (2016) found brain areas whose activation was negatively correlated with the entropy 
of the distribution of possible continuations (and Roark, Bachrach, Cardenas, and Pallier 
[2009] provide related behavioral evidence from self-paced reading times).  But the evidence 
for such effects is very limited.  Finally, some studies have investigated whether the degree to 
which processing of the target word reduces the entropy of the previous context (entropy 
reduction) may index processing difficulty.  However, the effects of entropy reduction are 
very small (Frank et al., 2015; Linzen & Jaeger, 2016) and in any case they may reflect 
integration rather than prediction. 
In sum, experimental research couched in terms of the information-theoretic notions 
of surprisal and entropy is compatible with prediction-based accounts. In fact, the same is 
true of studies concerned with the effects of Bayesian probability on the processing of words 
or sounds (e.g., Gibson, Bergen, & Piantadosi, 2013; Norris & McQueen, 2008). But none of 
these studies demonstrates that comprehenders use predictive mechanisms when 
understanding language, because the experimental effects occur on the predictable word 
itself, rather than before it occurs.  
 
How to demonstrate prediction (1.4).  
So far we have discussed the definition of prediction, how it differs from integration, 
how both prediction and integration can explain classic findings, and how they relate to the 
computational notions of surprisal and entropy.  We now ask what evidence could 
demonstrate prediction and distinguish it from integration.  We argue that demonstrating 
prediction requires a fundamentally different experimental approach than the one that has 
been used to demonstrate facilitatory effects of predictive contexts (e.g., Schwanenflugel & 
Shoben, 1985). In the latter kind of study, the focus is on processing of the (more or less) 
predictable word itself.  It is very difficult to demonstrate prediction using this approach and 
most such experiments do not determine whether prediction occurs – that is, whether the 
word or any aspects of its meaning, grammar, or form are pre-activated. 
To reiterate, prediction occurs if there is pre-activation of aspects of the linguistic 
representation of a predictable word (or other linguistic unit such as a speech sound).  By far 
the clearest demonstration of prediction occurs when a study reveals activation of a linguistic 
representation of a word before the comprehender encounters that word. So, for example, if a 
comprehender listening to (1) looks at a picture of a kite over, say, one of an airplane, before 
hearing the word kite (which they do; Altmann & Kamide, 1999), then we can conclude that 
they have predicted the meaning of kite. Similarly, to test whether the phonology /kaIt/ is 
predicted, we could use the context in (2).  
 
(2) The boy went out to the park to fly an … 
 
This context is only a slight variation of the context in (1), and here as well most people 
would predict kite immediately following fly. However, the form of the determiner an is 
incompatible with this prediction (as kite begins with a consonant). Therefore, if 
comprehenders experience difficulty at an, then we can conclude that they have predicted the 
initial sound of kite (as first suggested by DeLong, Urbach, & Kutas, 2005).  Finally, it is 
sometimes possible to measure pre-activation directly (as first attempted by Dikker & 
Pylkkänen, 2013). For example, since activation in the left middle temporal gyrus is linked to 
lexical retrieval, and is higher for less frequent words, we can use activity in this brain area as 
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an index of pre-activation of an upcoming lexical item (Fruchter, Linzen, Westerlund, & 
Marantz, 2015). 
 We noted that prediction occurs if comprehenders activate some component of a 
word’s linguistic representation before they could have done so on the basis of encountering 
it.  Of course, “bottom-up” activation of such linguistic representations takes some time – for 
example, lexical access in visual word recognition takes about 130-150ms (e.g., Sereno & 
Rayner, 2003; Carreiras, Armstrong, Perea, & Frost, 2014). If an effect is detected before the 
relevant representation could have been activated bottom up, then pre-activation – and hence 
prediction – must have occurred.  But such effects can only be used to demonstrate prediction 
if the time-course of such bottom-up activation is well established.  In section 2, we review 
studies that meet our criterion for prediction: They either show effects before the target word 
is encountered, or they show effects at the target word but too early for “bottom-up” 
activation to account for the effects.  We use these studies as the primary basis for the 
theoretical account of prediction that we develop in section 2. 
 A much larger group of studies are often interpreted as supporting or demonstrating 
prediction, but do not meet this criterion, as they do not test for effects before the predictable 
word.  This is the case for studies such as Schwanenflugel and Shoben (1985), Ehrlich and 
Rayner (1981), and Kutas and Hillyard (1984).  As argued above, they are compatible with 
both prediction and integration accounts.  Our interpretation of these studies therefore differs 
from Kuperberg and Jaeger (2016), who interpreted these and other findings as follows: “The 
simple point we wish to make at this stage is that it is logically impossible to explain these 
effects without assuming that the context influences the state of the language processing 
system before the bottom-up input is observed." (p. 33). We disagree with this claim, as such 
findings can be explained without pre-activation of the predictable word. 
 Many (otherwise interesting) studies can therefore be interpreted as due to integration 
just as well as to prediction.  When this is the case, we do not consider the studies further in 
this review.  But in fact there are many studies that do not test for effects before the critical 
word, but for which a prediction explanation is preferable to an integration explanation on the 
basis of additional considerations.  These studies require more detailed argumentation and are 
reviewed in section 3. 
 
A theory of prediction (2) 
 In Section 1, we defined what we mean by prediction and how it differs from both 
incremental interpretation and integration. Importantly, we also set out precise 
methodological criteria that must be met in order for a study to demonstrate prediction: It 
must either measure before the target word or demonstrate effects after the target word that 
could not be due to bottom-up processing. The aim of Section 2 is to present a theory of 
prediction in language comprehension that builds on evidence that meets these 
methodological criteria. We review this evidence thematically to build up to the theory which 
is presented in Section 2.6. 
 In a nutshell, our theory of prediction is general -- because it applies to prediction 
made at all linguistic levels, from semantics to syntax and form, and production-based, 
because it proposes that the central mechanism used by comprehenders to generate 
predictions is the same mechanism they use to produce their own utterances. To predict-by-
production, comprehenders first covertly imitate what they have comprehended so far. They 
then derive the intention underlying the utterance, taking into account the linguistic context 
provided by the utterance which has been covertly imitated, as well as aspects of background 
knowledge and other extra-linguistic information that the comprehender assumes are shared 
with the speaker. In addition, the comprehender may compensate for differences between 
herself and the speaker. Crucially, this derived intention is then run through the 
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comprehender’s own production system where it triggers the retrieval and building up of 
production representations, which constitute the comprehender’s prediction of the speaker’s 
upcoming utterance. Representations can be activated at any linguistic level, but activation at 
lower levels (such as form) follows activation at higher levels (such as semantics), just as in 
language production, and is dependent on sufficient time and resources being available to the 
comprehender. Thus, prediction-by-production is an optional mechanism that can support 
comprehension but is not necessary for comprehension to take place. Finally, we propose that 
prediction-by-production is augmented by an additional prediction mechanisms based on 
associations (prediction-by-association), which is less resource-intensive but also less 
accurate.     
 In the remainder of Section 2, we review evidence for each of the key proposals 
mentioned in the previous paragraph, namely that: comprehenders predict at all linguistic 
levels (2.1); comprehenders predict using their production system (2.2); comprehenders using 
prediction-by-production covertly imitate the speaker’s utterance, compute the derived 
intention, and run this derived intention through their production system; (2.3) prediction-by-
production is optional (2.4); comprehenders can also predict-by-association (2.5). Finally, we 
present the full theory of prediction in Section 2.6. 
 
Comprehenders Predict at All Linguistic Levels (2.1) 
In this section, we describe some studies that demonstrate that comprehenders predict 
aspects of meaning (semantics), grammar (syntax), and form.  We chose these studies 
because for each of them it is clear what level of representation is predicted. In accord with 
most psycholinguistics (e.g., Allport & Funnell, 1981; Forster, 1979; Levelt, Roelofs, & 
Meyer, 1999), we adopt the basic distinction of levels of representation into semantics, 
syntax, and form, and ignore further distinctions (which are often disputed among 
researchers) except when necessary.  We refer to semantic properties (concepts or features) 
with capitals (e.g., KITE, +FLYABLE), syntactic properties using italics (e.g., N for noun, 
ACC for accusative, or kite for the lemma3 – the syntactic component of the lexical entry), 
and form using standard linguistic transcriptions (e.g., /kaIt/ for the phonology of kite).   
Semantics. (2.1.1) Altmann and Kamide (1999) demonstrated prediction of semantics 
using the “visual world” paradigm. In this paradigm, participants see a small number of 
entities, either presented as isolated entities or arranged in a coherent scene, and hear an 
utterance (Tanenhaus et al., 1995; Sedivy, Tanenhaus, Chambers, & Carlson, 1999; 
Allopenna, Magnuson, & Tanenhaus, 1998).  They may act on those entities, for example 
picking up one of them (e.g., Tanenhaus et al. 1995), although in Altmann and Kamide they 
simply observed them.  In their study, participants saw a scene containing a boy, various toys 
(ball, toy train, toy car), and a cake. After a silent preview of the scene, they heard the boy 
will eat the…cake. Listeners’ looks to the different entities were measured using an eye-
tracker. Before they heard cake, they tended to look at the cake more than when they heard 
the boy will move the…cake.  Clearly, the verb eat requires an object that refers to an edible 
entity (whereas move does not), and the cake is the only edible entity in the scene.  The 
participant interpreted the scene as involving a cake, and therefore accessed its conceptual 
properties, critically including the fact that it is edible (unlike the other entities).  She then 
heard the boy will eat, retrieved the semantics of EAT, and looked at the only object in the 
scene whose associated conceptual representation included the feature +EDIBLE.4  The study 
                                                 
3 We also use italics to refer to words (as opposed to their referents) in examples from 
experiments. 
4 The participant must have normally identified the location of the cake before hearing eat. In 
other words, during the silent preview, the participant encoded the objects and their locations.  
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does not demonstrate whether the comprehender predicted the concept CAKE (or indeed the 
lemma cake or the form /keɪk/), nor that, in the absence of the object, the participant would 
predict CAKE, but it does demonstrate prediction of semantic features.  
 In addition, Grisoni, McCormick Miller, and Pulvermüller (2017) had participants 
listen to sentences that were highly constraining (around 80% Cloze) for a hand-related (e.g., 
I take a pen and I …write) or face-related verb (e.g., I find a cigarette on the desk and I … 
smoke). Negated versions of the high-constraining contexts (around 20% Cloze; e.g., I do not 
take the pen and I …) provided a low-constraining control.  Using EEG, they showed that 
after a high-constraining (but not a low-constraining) context participants pre-activated body-
specific parts of motor cortex involved in the action implied by the predictable verb (i.e., 
hand for write, face for smoke). This activation occurred during the 100ms before the onset of 
the predictable verb and shows prediction of verb meaning (just as body-specific activation 
occurs after the verb is encountered; e.g., Pulvermüller, Shtyrov, & Ilmoniemi, 2006). Thus, 
Grisoni et al., like Altmann and Kamide (1999), demonstrated that comprehenders predict 
conceptual features, but in addition showed they can do so in the absence of a supportive 
visual context. Again, this study does not demonstrate whether comprehenders predict a 
specific concept, but we later discuss some evidence that this is also the case (Thornhill & 
Van Petten, 2012; see section 2.1.2). 
Syntax. (2.1.2) Wicha, Moreno, and Kutas (2004) presented Spanish participants with 
highly constraining contexts (80% Cloze), such as Mis papa´s quisieron cargar poco en su 
viaje. Pero con lo que llevaba mi madre de ropa no les cupo todo en… (“My parents wanted 
to carry little on their trip. But with what my mother took in clothing, it did not all fit in…”).  
An article (elMASC) that was incompatible with the gender of the following predictable word 
(maletaFEM, suitcase) led to an enhanced late positivity, 500-700ms post-stimulus (but no 
enhanced N400).  Therefore, comprehenders used the context to predict the semantics, which 
in turn led to the specific prediction of the target lemma and its associated syntactic gender 
(the words were semantically neither male nor female).   
Similarly, Van Berkum, Brown, Zwitzerlood, Kooijman, and Hagoort (2005) had 
Dutch participants hear high-constraint (86% Cloze) contexts (e.g., De inbreker had geen 
enkele moeite de geheime familiekluis te vinden. Deze bevond zich natuurlijk achter een…, 
“The burglar had no trouble locating the secret family safe. This was of course located behind 
a…”), followed by a gender-marked adjective and the predictable noun (schilderij, 
paintingneuter) or an unpredictable but plausible noun of the opposite gender (boekenkast, 
bookcasecommon).  When participants encountered the unpredictable adjective (i.e., which 
agreed in gender with the unpredictable noun), ERPs showed a positivity 50-250ms after the 
adjective (e.g., grote, bigcommon) in comparison to the response for the predictable adjective 
(groot, bigneuter).  A self-paced reading experiment confirmed that readers were disrupted 
when they encountered the unpredictable adjective.    
In two related studies, Otten and colleagues also found evidence for prediction of 
grammatical gender at the adjective in Dutch, although with different ERP signatures. In a 
listening experiment, Otten, Nieuwland, and Van Berkum (2007) found the effect emerged 
between 300 and 600ms after the onset of the adjective, and as a negativity rather than a 
positivity. In a reading experiment, Otten and Van Berkum (2008; Experiment 2) found a 
later negativity between 900 and 1100ms after the onset of the adjective. In sum, while the 
ERP correlates of the gender prediction effect vary from study to study, comprehenders of 
languages that include a syntactic gender category appear to predict this syntactic feature.  
                                                 
This is consistent with the evidence from the “blank screen” paradigm (Altmann, 2004), in 
which the pictures are removed before the onset of the sentence and participants fixate on the 
location where the critical object had been. 
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Form. (2.1.3) Delong et al. (2005) recorded ERPs while participants read sentences 
such as The day was breezy so the boy went outside to fly… (presented one word at a time, 
with a 500ms interval between the appearance of successive words) and showed that the 
amplitude of the N400 on the noun was larger when the sentence ended with the 
unpredictable an airplane than the predictable a kite.  More importantly, a related effect 
occurred at the preceding article: The amplitude of the N400 on the article was negatively 
correlated with the article’s Cloze (which ranged from 0% to 96% in the study).  This finding 
at the article implies that comprehenders predicted an aspect of the form of the predictable 
noun – whether it began with a consonant or a vowel – and were therefore surprised if the 
article was not compatible with this prediction.  (An integration explanation is very unlikely 
as it would require people to find it easier to integrate fly a vs. fly an, and as a and an do not 
differ semantically, they should not give rise to an N400).5   
Ito, Pickering, and Corley (2018) had native English participants listen to very highly 
constraining (Cloze: 97.5%) sentences (e.g., The tourists expected rain when the sun went 
behind the…) while looking at visual displays that contained a depiction of the highly 
predictable word (cloud), a form-related competitor (clown), or an unrelated competitor 
(globe). (A fourth condition is discussed in section 1.4.3). As expected, participants looked at 
the depiction of the predictable word more than the unrelated competitor from about 600ms 
before the predictable word onset. Crucially, they also looked at the depiction of the form-
related competitor more than the unrelated competitor between 500 and 350ms before the 
predictable word onset. Hence, they pre-activated the form of the predictable word well in 
advance of encountering it.  
In a study using magnetoencephalography (MEG), Dikker, Rabagliati, Farmer, and 
Pylkkänen (2010) presented participants with contexts that predicted a syntactic category 
(noun or verb participle), and then a target noun which had visual characteristics that were 
typical (e.g., soda) or atypical (e.g., infant) of the orthography of nouns. So participants read 
a context that predicted a noun followed by a typical noun (e.g., The tasteful soda), a matched 
context that predicted a verb followed by the same typical noun (The tastefully soda), or 
either type of context followed by an atypical noun (e.g., The cute/cutely infant). They found 
enhanced activity in visual cortex after 100-130ms (an M100) for a typical noun in a verb-
biasing context versus a typical noun in a noun-biasing context, but no difference between 
contexts for atypical nouns. The effect was thus present only when there was a mismatch 
between the predictable syntactic category and the visual form of the target word.   
 Crucially, although the effect was not found before the target word, it occurred too 
rapidly to be the result of integration. Lexical access in visual word recognition takes 130-
150ms (e.g., Sereno & Rayner, 2003; Carreiras et al., 2014), and so the process of activating 
syntactic category information (which is part of the lexical entry) and trying to integrate it 
with the syntactic representation of the context should have taken more than 130ms. Further, 
the effect was localized to a visual brain area, which strongly suggests that it was not elicited 
                                                 
5 We note that a recent study (Ito, Martin, & Nieuwland, 2016) did not replicate this effect. 
Nieuwland et al. (2017) conducted a nine-lab replication of De Long et al. (2005) which also 
did not show the effect (though see Yan, Kuperberg, & Jaeger, 2017 for some criticism of 
their methodology). Martin et al. (2013) did however find a larger N400 to unpredictable (1% 
Cloze) than predictable (69% Cloze) articles using a design in which the sentence context 
was first presented as a whole (and remained on screen until participants pressed a button), 
and then the article and noun were presented one at a time, with a 700ms interval. In sum, the 
extent to which form prediction can be detected using the form of the article (which of course 
might in fact be due to the form of an intervening adjective; e.g., an orange kite) is currently 
unclear. 
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by syntactic processing but rather by visual form processing differences.6 This finding means 
that comprehenders predicted the syntactic category of the upcoming word and that 
category’s typical visual form. When they predicted a noun, they also predicted noun-like 
features, and this resulted in a reduced M100 for more typical nouns (see also Dikker, 
Rabagliati, & Pylkkänen, 2009; Herrmann, Maess, Hasting, & Friederici, 2009).7  
 
Comprehenders Predict Using Their Production Systems (2.2) 
We propose that the central mechanism for prediction is what we term prediction-by-
production.  People can comprehend incomplete utterances and complete them using their 
language production system as they do in the Cloze task, constructing some of the 
representations involved in overt speech (or writing) but stopping short of overt production.  
We base our proposal on Pickering and Garrod (2007, 2013), but the idea that prediction uses 
production processes is shared with Dell and Chang (2014), who argued that the same 
mechanisms are used to make predictions during language comprehension and production (in 
their P-chain framework; see also F. Chang, Dell, & Bock, 2006).  We also note that other 
theorists consider a role for production in prediction (Federmeier, 2007; Huettig, 2015).   
Evidence that the production system is activated during comprehension (e.g., Fadiga, 
Craighero, Buccino, & Rizzolatti, 2002; Pulvermüller et al., 2006) is of course compatible 
with our proposal. Our proposal also accords with evidence that the role of production 
mechanisms is enhanced in speech comprehension under adverse conditions (see the meta-
analysis by Adank, 2012), under the assumption that adverse conditions cause comprehenders 
to rely more on prediction-by-production. For example, comprehenders are better at 
understanding a novel accent in noise after training to imitate the accent (which presumably 
helps them develop new production representations that can assist with comprehension; 
Adank, Hagoort, & Bekkering, 2010). In addition, motor evoked potentials (MEPs) elicited 
by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) of the lip area in motor cortex are larger when 
participants listen to distorted compared to natural speech (particularly when listening to 
                                                 
6 Note that all critical comparisons in Dikker et al. (2010) were within target nouns, and there 
were effects of form typicality even in trial-level analyses, making it extremely unlikely that 
M100 differences were spurious.  
7 In a related self-paced reading study, Farmer, Christiansen, and Monaghan (2006) had 
participants read a context that predicted a verb (e.g., The very old man attempted to) and 
found that they took longer to read a noun-like verb than a verb-like verb. However, Staub, 
Grant, Clifton, and Rayner (2009) did not find any equivalent effect (though see Farmer, 
Monaghan, Misyak, & Christiansen, 2011 for a response). Farmer, Yan, Bicknell, and 
Tanenhaus (2015) found typicality effects on first fixation durations using eye-tracking. 
Importantly, they also showed that typicality effects were stronger when the syntactic 
category was more predictable. If Farmer et al.’s (2006, 2015) findings are robust, they are 
compatible with syntax-to-form prediction as shown by Dikker et al.’s MEG measures.  But 
note that typicality effects on their own (i.e., without evidence for a modulation by category 
predictability) would also be compatible with an alternative explanation: The comprehender 
may simply find it easier to determine that a verb-like verb is a verb than that a noun-like 
verb is a verb, and consequently could begin the process of integration more quickly in the 
former case. Thus, showing an interaction between typicality and category predictability (as 
in Dikker et al., 2010 and Farmer et al., 2015) is essential to demonstrate prediction. In 
addition, Dikker et al.’s MEG data are stronger than the eye-tracking data because the 
typicality by predictability interaction in Farmer et al. (2015) was only robust for gaze 
duration measures (but not for first fixation durations), so it is unclear whether the effect 
occurred sufficiently early to rule out an integration-based explanation. 
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sounds that require movement of the lips in their articulation; Nuttall, Kennedy-Higgins, 
Hogan, Devlin, & Adank, 2016).   
More importantly, recent evidence shows not only that the production system is 
involved in language comprehension, but also that production involvement during 
comprehension underlies prediction. Some of this evidence comes from studies showing 
parallels between prediction and production (Hintz & Meyer, 2015) or correlations between 
prediction and production skills (Rommers, Meyer, & Huettig, 2015; Hintz et al. 2017), and 
is thus supportive but not conclusive. Hintz and Meyer found that Dutch participants who 
listened to simple mathematical equations (e.g., 3+8=11) looked at the solution (i.e., a 
number displayed on a clock face) predictively, and did so with similar timing to participants 
who had to complete those equations (3+8=), but these common patterns of behavior do not 
necessitate a common mechanism. Rommers et al. (2015; cf. Rommers et al., 2013) showed 
that listeners with higher verbal fluency (i.e., production ability) make more predictive looks 
to a predictable picture (e.g., a picture of a moon after the sentence In 1969 zette Neil 
Armstrong als eerste mens voet op de…, “In 1969 Neil Armstrong was the first man to set 
foot on the …”), and Hintz et al. similarly found that verbal fluency accounts for a large 
proportion of between-listener variance in looks to a predictable picture (e.g., apple after De 
man schilt op dit moment een…, “The man peels at this moment…”), at least when listeners 
are given a long time to preview the pictures in the display (in contrast, receptive vocabulary 
explained individual variance in predictive looks regardless of the amount of preview). These 
correlational findings, however, do not demonstrate a causal role for the production system 
during prediction in language comprehension. 
But crucially, there is direct evidence for such causal relationship. First, Drake and 
Corley (2015) had participants listen to highly constraining contexts and then name a picture 
that corresponded either to the predictable word (match) or to a word that differed in onset 
from the predictable word (mismatch; e.g., cap for tap).  Using ultrasound recordings, they 
compared articulation in the match and mismatch conditions to articulation in a control 
condition in which participants named the same pictures in isolation. They found that 
articulation diverged more from the control in the mismatch than in the match condition, 
suggesting that listeners predicted the final word using production mechanisms, and that such 
predictions affected articulation.   
Second, predictive looks were disrupted by cerebellar rTMS (Lesage, Morgan, Olson, 
Meyer, & Miall, 2012) in a study closely based on Altmann and Kamide (1999): 
Comprehenders took longer to fixate on cake when they heard The boy will eat the … after 
they had received repetitive stimulation (thought to be inhibitory) to the right cerebellum. No 
delay occurred when they heard The boy will move the …, indicating that the disruption was 
specific to predictive language processing. Moreover, no prediction-specific effects occurred 
when comprehenders received no stimulation or stimulation to a control site. These findings 
make sense because the cerebellum contributes to “fast and flexible motor control by 
predicting the sensory consequences of movements on a fine timescale” (p. R795), and most 
likely does so for language production as well as for other types of movement (Ito, 2008; see 
also Moberget, Gullesen, Andersson, Ivry, & Endestad, 2014; Miall et al., 2016).  
Most importantly, Martin, Branzi, and Bar (2018) showed that prediction of the noun 
gender at the article in Spanish (as in Wicha et al., 2004) was reduced under articulatory 
suppression: Comprehenders were asked to produce the syllable /ta/ in time with visual 
presentation of each word in a sentence, up until three words prior to the presentation of a 
gender-marked article that either matched or mismatched their prediction. Whereas N400 
amplitude at the (more or less expected noun) was unaffected by this manipulation, the N400 
elicited by unexpected articles was reduced under articulatory suppression, suggesting that 
engaging the production system selectively impaired prediction and not comprenshion as a 
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whole. Moreover, no N400 reduction occurred in participants who either listened to a 
recording of themselves producing the syllable /ta/ or tapped their tongue (without producing 
a speech sound) in time with visual presentation of the words.  These findings suggest that 
language production interferes with prediction (as indexed by the N400 reduction), rather 
than language comprehension or comparable non-linguistic action. In sum, several lines of 
evidence support our proposal that prediction during comprehension is based on production 
mechanisms. 
 
Prediction-by-production (2.3) 
Having argued that comprehenders predict by production in the previous section, we 
now describe the three key stages of the prediction-by-production mechanism. Motivation for 
these stages comes in part from evidence about prediction during language comprehension 
and in part from evidence about language production. Our aim is to integrate these two 
sources of evidence with each other and into our theory.  
In order to predict by production, the comprehender must first determine (via non-
predictive incremental comprehension processes) the linguistic representations corresponding 
to the speaker’s utterance so far (the linguistic context). But these representations are part of 
the comprehension system; in order to constrain production processes, equivalent 
representations need to be activated within the production system. The first stage of 
prediction-by-production, which we term covert imitation (Pickering & Garrod, 2013), 
involves the activation of production representations that correspond to the representations 
built by the comprehension system. In practice, this stage might be often facilitated by 
representational parity - that is the fact that the production and comprehension system share 
representations. In fact, we have argued elsewhere (Gambi & Pickering, 2017) that there is 
good evidence for shared lexico-semantic and syntactic representations at least (evidence is 
less clear at the form level).  
The second stage involves deriving the intention underlying the speaker’s utterance. 
In addition to what the speaker has said so far, the comprehender also takes into account 
shared background knowledge and the shared visual (or other extra-linguistic) context. Such 
additional information, which collectively we label non-linguistic context, constrains the 
process of inverse mapping (from linguistic representations to intention, rather than from 
intention to linguistic representations, as normally is the case in production), and affects its 
output. This output is the derived intention that the comprehender assumes will underlie what 
the speaker will say next. In the third and final stage, the comprehender runs the derived 
intention through her own production system to construct linguistic representations 
underlying the predicted utterance. 
Covert imitation. (2.3.1) If comprehenders did not take into account the linguistic 
context, they would often predict completions that were incompatible with the utterance 
produced by the speaker.  But this is not the case. In fact, comprehenders’ predictions are 
usually constrained by the linguistic context. Consider, for example, Kamide, Altmann, and 
Haywood (2003a, Experiment 3). In a visual-world experiment, they contrasted Japanese 
sentences such as waitress-NOM customer-DAT merrily hamburger-ACC bring (“The 
waitress will merrily bring the hamburger to the customer”) and waitress-NOM customer-
ACC merrily tease (“The waitress will merrily tease the customer”).  Up until merrily, 
comprehenders may construct very similar representations for both sentences, and generate 
very similar predictions: for example, that the speaker intends to talk about an event 
involving a waitress performing some action in relation to a customer. However, the 
linguistic context specifies that customer is a recipient in the former, but not the latter 
sentence. Accordingly, participants predicted that a theme would be mentioned (in effect, 
because a recipient needs to be the recipient of something), and looked at the hamburger (a 
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possible theme) more when customer was marked as dative (and thus typically a recipient) 
than when it was marked as accusative.   
Covert imitation can account for the evidence that predictions are constrained by the 
linguistic context. Via covert imitation, the comprehender turns comprehension 
representations into production representations. Such representations affect subsequent 
processing within the production system, causing it to be congruent with the linguistic 
context provided by the speaker’s utterance. For example, listeners in Kamide et al. (2003a) 
covertly imitated the speaker’s representation in which customer-DAT is the recipient and 
then predicted that the speaker would produce a plausible theme, which was the hamburger in 
that scene. Note that, since the lexical content (i.e., waitress, customer, merrily) did not differ 
across conditions, participants must have covertly imitated the thematic and syntactic 
structure of the utterance, so that hamburger was predicted more strongly when the structure 
of the utterance made its mention more likely.  
Similarly, in two Dutch studies demonstrating that comprehenders predict syntactic 
gender (see Section 2.1.1), Otten et al. (2007) and Otten and Van Berkum (2008, Experiment 
2) showed that predictions of gender also depend on covert imitation of the structure of the 
sentence: Comprehenders showed evidence of having predicted the target lemma (sword) and 
its syntactic gender (neuter) after predictive contexts (e.g., The brave knight saw that the 
dragon threatened the benevolent sorcerer. Quickly he reached for a bigcommon but rather old 
swordneuter) more than after control contexts that contained the same content words in 
different structural roles (e.g., The benevolent sorcerer saw that the dragon threatened the 
brave knight. Quickly he reached for a bigcommon but rather old swordneuter). 
Finally, Hintz et al. (2017) examined the extent to which the strength of the 
association between the verb (peel) and the predictable word (apple) could account for 
predictive looks in a visual-world study. General associations between the verb and the 
predictable word did not explain variance in predictive looks, but functional associations did. 
Functional associations take into account the structural relationship between the verb and the 
predictable word (i.e., they measure how likely apple is to be the object of peel; see McRae et 
al., 2005). Thus, these findings once again suggest that predictive looks are constrained by 
covert imitation of structure and are not merely driven by the lexical content of the utterance. 
Deriving the intention. (2.3.2) In the previous section, we have shown that covert 
imitation of the linguistic context constrains the predictions made via the production system, 
using predictive looks towards a potential theme (hamburger) in Kamide et al.’s (2003a) 
Japanese experiment as one example. But in addition to the linguistic context, the 
comprehender also takes into account the non-linguistic context, such as shared background 
knowledge (e.g., that customers are likely to order hamburgers) and the shared visual context 
(e.g., that a hamburger is visually present). Together, shared linguistic context, visual context, 
and background knowledge provide the three components of the “common ground” that 
underlies much successful communication (H.H. Clark, 1996). By incorporating these three 
components in the process of computing the derived intention, the comprehender maximizes 
her chances of correctly predicting what the speaker will say.   
 But of course there is an obvious difference between speaking and predicting what the 
speaker will say: The speaker knows his own intention but the comprehender cannot be 
certain of the speaker’s intention. In many cases, the information provided by the linguistic 
and non-linguistic context will be sufficient for the comprehender to recover the speaker’s 
intention, because the assumption that this information is shared between the comprehender 
and the speaker is correct.  This is likely to be the case when speaker and comprehender can 
recall what has been said, have access to the same visual information, and their background 
knowledge is sufficiently similar in the relevant domain (e.g., they share a restaurant script; 
Schank & Abelson, 1977). 
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However, the comprehender sometimes needs to compensate for differences between 
herself and the speaker, including differences in access to background knowledge, visual 
context, and indeed memory for the content of previous utterances. Some studies suggest that 
they fail to compensate (Keysar, Barr, & Horton, 1998; Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner, 
2000; Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003), at least during early processing, and are therefore 
egocentric.  But other studies suggest they can be more successful.  For example, Hanna, 
Tanenhaus, and Trueswell (2003) either had a speaker instruct a listener about where to place 
a red triangle on a grid (so that the shape unambiguously became part of common ground), or 
asked the listener to place a red triangle on a secret location on their grid, unbeknownst to the 
speaker (so that the shape was unambiguously excluded from common ground). The speaker 
then said Now put the blue triangle on the red one, referring to another red triangle (the 
target). Listeners looked at the target and the identical competitor which was in common 
ground equally often, but were far more likely to look at the target than at the competitor 
which was not in common ground, and did so from the very onset of red. This study suggests 
comprehenders can rapidly take into account what they believe the speaker is aware of and 
therefore that their derived intention incorporates adjustments for self-other differences (i.e., 
it is not merely what would be the comprehender’s own intention under the circumstances); 
see Brown-Schmidt (2009) for related evidence. However, the studies by Keysar and 
colleagues also suggest that the egocentric perspective is not always overridden.  
Importantly, self-other adjustments to the derived intention affect predictions of what 
the speaker is likely to say next. Thus, Barr (2008) found that common ground determines 
which objects listeners predict the speaker will refer to (even though when listeners later hear 
the object name they look at objects with similar names which are not in common ground). 
To further illustrate the point, we consider a visual-world eye-tracking study by Chambers 
and San Juan (2008). In one condition, participants moved an object around a grid, in 
response to instructions such as Move the chair to Area 2.  When participants then heard Now 
return the …, they looked at the chair more often than when they heard Now move the …. 
Based on the meaning of return, they predicted another reference to the previously mentioned 
object. But when the speaker asked participants to move two objects before saying Now 
return the …, participants did not preferentially look at the chair, as it was not unambiguously 
the referent.  Crucially, however, this pattern of effects occurred when the participant knew 
the speaker was also aware of this ambiguity, but not when the participant moved one of the 
objects unbeknownst to the speaker. Thus comprehenders predicted that the chair would be 
mentioned on the basis of a derived intention that incorporated their beliefs about how the 
speaker’s intention differed from their own. 
Running the intention through the production system. (2.3.3) Having derived the 
intention, the comprehender is now in a position to predict the speaker’s upcoming utterance. 
To do so, she runs the derived intention through her production system, reproducing some of 
the processes involved in speaking but stopping before overt articulation. This process 
constitutes prediction-by-production and, of course, it shares many characteristics with 
language production; therefore below we describe each of the stages of language production 
(Levelt, 1989; see also Goldrick, Ferreira, & Miozzo, 2014), and once we have identified the 
key characteristics of each stage, we discuss evidence that they apply to prediction during 
language comprehension as well.  
In the first stage of speaking (so-called conceptualization), people construct a 
semantic representation that includes entities, events, and their relations (e.g., indicating who 
did what to whom).  In non-sentential contexts (e.g., when naming a pictured object), this 
stage takes around 150-200ms (Indefrey & Levelt, 2004; Indefrey, 2011), and leads to the 
activation of conceptual features, for example +FLYABLE for kite; it may also include 
activation of a unitary KITE concept (Levelt et al., 1999), though this is controversial (cf. 
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Dell, 1986; Bierwisch & Schreuder, 1992).  Importantly, although related concepts such as 
AIRPLANE, BALLOON, or STRING, or features such as +LIGHT or +COLORFUL, also 
receive some (but less) activation (i.e., a space of related concepts are activated in parallel), 
activation is quickly directed only to those concepts that are relevant in the context of the 
utterance that is being produced. So after The boy went out to the park to fly, KITE, 
AIRPLANE, and perhaps BALLOON remain activated, but the activation of STRING 
quickly decays.  
We propose that such parallel, but directed, activation characterizes prediction-by-
production of semantic representations (concepts or features): for example, prediction of 
+EDIBLE in Altmann and Kamide (1999), or prediction of body-specific features in Grisoni 
et al. (2017). Using Altmann and Kamide (1999) as an example, it may be that the concept 
CAKE retains or increases its activation (compared to other edible entities) because of the 
presence of a depicted cake in the scene, which constitutes shared visual information and thus 
constrains the process of deriving the underlying intention. This illustrates how a 
comprehender using prediction-by-production first accesses a potentially large network of 
semantic representations (e.g., all concepts that share the feature +EDIBLE), but then directs 
the activation so that relevant concepts, and specifically those that are compatible with the 
results of covert imitation and the derived intention, retain (or gain additional) activation, 
whereas irrelevant concepts rapidly lose activation.  
In production, conceptualization is followed by the processes of syntactic encoding 
(Bock & Levelt, 1994) and lexical selection (Levelt et al., 1999). Syntactic encoding refers to 
the process of mapping the event structure activated as part of the semantic representation 
(e.g., TRANSFER event) to an appropriate syntactic frame. So for example, a speaker 
intending to describe a scene where an agent transfers a theme object to a recipient will 
typically select either a prepositional object frame (PO, as in The assassin will send a parcel 
to the dictator) or a double object frame (DO, as in The assassin will send the dictator a 
parcel). Which frame is selected will depend on a range of factors including which frame(s) 
the speaker has selected most recently (i.e., on structural priming; Bock, 1986b; Pickering & 
Ferreira, 2008) and on the outcome of lexical selection for the verb (e.g., V. Ferreira, 1996) 
or the nouns (e.g., Bock, 1986a).  
Comprehenders can similarly predict syntactic structures and categories on the basis 
of the event structure, and they also take previous experience and lexical restrictions into 
account while doing so. For example, Arai, Van Gompel, and Scheepers (2007) had 
participants read a PO or a DO sentence (with very similar meanings) and then listen to 
another PO or DO sentence, in a context containing pictures of the theme and the recipient.  
When they heard the verb, they tended to look at the entity corresponding to its theme if they 
had heard a PO but at the entity corresponding to its recipient if they had heard a DO (when 
the verb was repeated; see also Arai, Nakamura, & Mazuka, 2015).  Another study showed 
that the effect could not be due to repetition of the order of animate versus inanimate entities 
(Carminati, van Gompel, Scheepers, & Arai, 2008), and there is consensus that structural 
priming is mainly driven by repetition of syntactic structure (Pickering & Ferreira, 2008). In 
addition, structural priming sometimes affects predictions even without verb repetition 
(Thothathiri & Snedeker, 2008). In sum, as in production, comprehenders appear to predict 
syntax and rapidly select a single structure. This process of selecting an appropriate structure 
of course depends on compatibility with the results of covert imitation, as already discussed 
in relation to Kamide et al. (2003a). 
Alongside syntactic encoding, speakers engage in lexical selection. Lexical selection 
is the process of accessing the lemma associated with the currently most activated concept 
(kite), together with the lemmas associated with related concepts (airplane, balloon).  
According to Levelt et al. (1999), a speaker naming a single object compares these lemmas 
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and generally selects the most activated one in around 70-90ms (Indefrey, 2011).  This 
selection process likely requires some processing resources, although it can occur without full 
attention (Roelofs & Piai, 2011). Selection of a lemma leads to activation of lexicalized 
syntactic information, for example the grammatical gender of the selected item (e.g., 
Vigliocco, Antonini, & Garrett, 1997).  
Similarly, during prediction-by-production, the comprehender can also access the 
grammatical properties of a predicted item.  Importantly, the comprehender must have 
predicted semantics before predicting syntax, just as in production. So for example, recall that 
in Van Berkum et al. (2005; see also Wicha et al., 2004; Otten et al., 2007, Otten & Van 
Berkum, 2008, Exp. 2), participants comprehended sentence contexts that strongly predicted 
a noun (painting) and were disrupted when they encountered an adjective whose gender (non-
neuter) was incompatible with this noun.  This finding supports prediction-by-production, 
with the context leading to semantic activation of the concept PAINTING that then in turn 
leads to activation of the associated lemma (painting) and its grammatical gender. 
At this point, we reach a point of controversy within theories of word production.  
Levelt et al. (1999) assumed that speakers select a single lemma and access its word-form, 
which captures its phonological properties.  A speaker who prepares to name a kite therefore 
activates /kaIt/ but not /ˈeəpleɪn/ or /bəˈluːn/.  In contrast, Dell (1986) argued that speakers 
can activate the phonology of more than one candidate item.  In fact, much evidence indicates 
that such parallel activation does sometimes occur, for example for near-synonyms (e.g., 
Peterson & Savoy, 1998).  Next, the speaker constructs a phonetic representation that feeds 
into the process of articulation, and all alternatives except one are eventually abandoned.   It 
takes 180-200ms to access phonological and syllabic information, and a further 110-200ms to 
phonetically encode and begin articulation (Indefrey, 2011), though these timings may be 
affected by context (Strijkers & Costa, 2016).  
Similarly, comprehenders using prediction-by-production may activate the phonology 
of predictable words after performing lexical access.  For example, participants in Ito et al. 
(2018) predicted the phonological (or possibly orthographic) form of cloud after predicting 
the semantic and syntactic representations associated with cloud on the basis of a highly 
constraining context. This process parallels language production, with phonological 
activation occurring later and being dependent on lexical activation (and we note that looks to 
the picture of the phonological competitor occurred after looks to the predictable word). 
In summary, we have reviewed experimental findings that highlight how the key 
stages and components of language production, from semantics to form, are reflected in 
prediction during language comprehension.  Comprehenders predict meaning, in which case 
they activate many aspects of meaning in parallel, and rapidly focus on the elements that are 
relevant for production.  They predict syntax, in which case they also select an appropriate 
lemma and its syntactic properties.  And they can also predict phonology (or other aspects of 
sound), in which case activation narrows down to a single word form and its phonological 
properties.  As in theories of production, predictions of syntax and phonology involve fewer 
alternatives than predictions of semantics, take longer to construct, and are dependent on 
predictions of semantics. 
Our examples have considered the predictions people make at a specific point in an 
utterance.  But they can repeatedly predict during comprehension, going through cycles of 
predicting-by-production. As she encounters more of the utterance, the comprehender 
incrementally updates a representation of the speaker’s intention underlying that utterance. 
Importantly, this representation does not only constitute the basis of the comprehender’s 
ongoing understanding of the speaker’s utterance, but it is also provides the input to cycles of 
prediction-by-production that repeatedly generate candidate continuations for the speaker’s 
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utterance. An example (for the utterance The boy went out to the park to fly a kite) is 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. An example sentence with predictions that may be computed at three different time 
points (after The boy, after The boy went out to the, and after The boy went out to fly a). 
Downward arrows represent the process of comprehension and the derivation of the 
underlying intention. Upward arrows represent the activation of the production system and 
abbreviations stand for the three main stages of production (sem = semantics, syn = syntax, 
phon = phonology). The example illustrates the fact that comprehenders comprehend 
continuously (as indicated by the single long box representing the continuously updated 
representation of the derived intention underlying this utterance), and can predict at any time 
during comprehension, but do not always go through all the stages of production (and instead 
can stop at any point during the production process).  
 
 
The Optionality of Prediction (2.4) 
We have shown that people can predict by initiating the process of language 
production while comprehending an utterance produced by someone else, as though they 
were using it to complete the utterance, and that they can go through cycles of predicting-by-
production, repeatedly updating their predictions as they encounter more of the utterance. 
Now we propose that, although comprehenders can predict-by-production, they are unlikely 
to do so at every word in the utterance, or to go through all the stages of production at every 
cycle. In other words, prediction-by-production is optional. 
To illustrate this with an example, we return to predictions that might occur while 
comprehending the utterance The boy went out to the park to fly a kite in Figure 1. Horizontal 
arrows represent the production system, and abbreviations within them indicate the stages of 
production the comprehender goes through as part of different prediction-by-production 
cycles. For instance, after The boy she may predict that the speaker will describe an event 
(but be unsure which one) and that the speaker will use a verb.  This leads to the activation of 
the meaning EVENT and the syntactic category V.  After The boy went out to the, the 
comprehender’s production system leads to the activation of the semantic category of OPEN-
SPACE.  After The boy went out to the park to fly a, it leads to the activation of the specific 
word kite, which includes all of its lexical information (e.g., +FLYABLE, noun, /kaIt/), 
including the fact that the first phoneme of kite is a consonant.  In sum, this comprehender 
can go through all the stages of production (from semantics to form), as is the case for the 
prediction of kite, but she does not do so at every word. 
There are two good reasons why comprehenders may seldom go through all the stages 
of production as shown in this example. First, each stage takes time, and so comprehenders 
may not have the later stages ready in time for the predictions to be useful. Second, 
prediction-by-production requires resources (just as production does), and sufficient 
resources may not always be available. We discuss these two points in more detail below 
(sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2).  
These points lead us to propose that prediction-by-production is not a necessary 
component of language comprehension: At some points in a sentence, comprehenders may 
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not predict at all, and at other points they may predict early stages (e.g., semantics) but not 
later stages (e.g., form).  Note that the proposal that prediction is optional distinguishes our 
account of prediction during language comprehension from predictive coding accounts of 
perception (Friston, 2005; A. Clark, 2013), as they essentially equate the process of 
perceiving with prediction; this proposal is instead shared with Huettig and Mani (2016). We 
conclude this section by discussing evidence for the optionality of prediction-by-production 
(2.4.3). 
The timing of prediction-by-production. (2.4.1) Prediction-by-production can only 
be as fast as the comprehender’s production system. The comprehender must run the 
intention through her production system, but before she can do that she must also determine 
the speaker’s intention, which involves compensating for differences between herself and the 
speaker (and will be harder and more time-consuming if the discrepancy is greater).  
Importantly, prediction-by-production may occur for the earlier stages of production when it 
does not occur for the later stages (Indefrey & Levelt, 2004), because the earlier stages are 
more likely to be completed “in time” (i.e., before the speaker begins articulating the 
predicted word).   
For the same reason, although prediction-by-production can occur in all acts of 
comprehension, it is more likely to reach later stages when the speaker is slower than faster.  
It is particularly likely when comprehending speakers that are slow or disfluent, for example 
when they have difficulty with what is being uttered.  It is also more likely when the 
presentation rate is slow, as in many psycholinguistic experiments (see sections 3.1 and 3.2 
for data).  As most natural comprehension involves fast speech rates (e.g., Quené, 2008), 
comprehenders may often have insufficient time to predict form by production, but they are 
more likely to have enough time to predict semantics (and perhaps syntax).  In addition, 
slower producers (such as less proficient non-native speakers) are less likely to use 
prediction-by-production (see section 2.4.3).   
 It is important to stress that comprehenders can predict well in advance of the 
predictable item.  The comprehender incrementally updates a representation of the speaker’s 
intention, and uses that representation to generate predictions in a continuous manner (see 
Figure 1). This means that the comprehender may sometimes be able to begin prediction-by-
production earlier than the previous word.  
Indeed, we know that speakers prepare more than one word at a time.  Meyer (1996) 
had participants produce conjoined phrases (cup and table) and found that a semantic 
distractor affected production whether it was related to the first or the second word, but a 
phonological distractor affected production only if it was related to the first word.  Her 
finding suggests that speakers plan semantics further ahead than phonology (see also Smith & 
Wheeldon, 2004).  In a similar way, comprehenders could predict semantics further ahead 
than phonology. If so, they may sometimes pre-activate the semantics of the predicted word 
well ahead of when the word is predicted to occur.  They may also be able to predict the 
phonology “in time” (i.e., before the word) because advanced prediction of semantics gives 
them a head-start when it comes to predicting phonology as well. We know of no study that 
has manipulated the scope of semantic prediction directly, and so we do not know whether 
predictions of phonological forms would be more likely when comprehenders can predict 
semantics further ahead.  
Use of resources in prediction-by-production. (2.4.2) Several dual-tasking studies 
of picture naming suggest that all stages of production up to and including phonology are 
resource intensive and require attention (see Roelofs & Piai, 2011). Hence, prediction-by-
production should also take up resources as well as time. What is more, such resources are 
likely shared with aspects of comprehension (cf. Kempen, 2014), as suggested by much 
neuroscientific evidence (Menenti, Gerhan, Segaert, & Hagoort, 2011; Segaert, Menenti, 
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Weber, Petersson, & Hagoort, 2012; Silbert, Honey, Simony, Poeppel, & Hasson, 2014). 
Consistent with this, dual-tasking studies of dialogue indicate that a secondary task 
performed concurrently with comprehension is disrupted the most when the comprehender is 
about to start speaking (Boiteau, Malone, Peters, & Almor, 2014; Sjerps & Meyer, 2015), 
suggesting that preparation for upcoming production is resource-intensive. We might 
therefore expect that prediction-by-production may sometimes even interfere with the process 
of comprehension.  
Indeed, higher cognitive load on comprehenders appears to make prediction less 
likely. For example, Huettig and Janse (2016) found that comprehenders with better working 
memory and faster processing speed make more predictive eye-movements in the visual 
world paradigm. In addition, Ito, Corley, and Pickering (2017) found that such eye-
movements are delayed under memory load.  However, it may be that these effects of 
cognitive load are in part dependent on the experimental method. Using the same ERP 
paradigm as Otten and Van Berkum (2008), Otten and Van Berkum (2009) found that both an 
early and a late negativity were elicited by Dutch adjectives incompatible with the gender of 
an expected noun. Somewhat surprisingly, low-working memory participants showed a more 
marked late negativity, potentially suggesting they predicted more, but in contrast the early 
negativity was not affected by the comprehenders’ working memory; thus, it is unclear to 
what extent individual differences in working memory capacity affect prediction of syntax in 
this paradigm. In sum, more research is needed to explore the impact of cognitive load on 
prediction-by-production, but there is already some evidence that the latter is resource-
intensive. 
Prediction-by-production does not always occur. (2.4.3) Evidence for the 
optionality of prediction-by-production comes from groups of comprehenders who show 
limited or no prediction, while still being able to comprehend. Mitsugi and MacWhinney 
(2016) found that non-native (L2) Japanese speakers did not use case-marking 
(dative/accusative) to predict in a visual world study based on Kamide et al. (2003a; 
Experiment 3).  Thus, L2 speakers may not predict in conditions when native speakers do 
predict.  However, Foucart, Martin, Moreno, and Costa (2014) found that both late French-
Spanish and early Catalan-Spanish bilinguals reading Spanish predicted the gender of a 
highly predictable (81% Cloze) noun (see Foucart, Ruiz-Tada, & Costa, 2016 for similar 
results in speech). 
In an ERP study based on DeLong et al. (2005), Martin et al. (2013) found that late 
Spanish-English bilinguals (who learned English after age 8) did not predict the phonological 
form of a highly predictable noun (unlike English monolinguals), despite being familiar with 
the a/an rule for English.8  Moreover, Ito et al. (2018) found that Japanese L2 speakers of 
English did not look at a phonological competitor of a highly predictable noun while listening 
to English sentences (unlike native English speakers; see section 2.1.3).  (They did look at the 
competitor after hearing the highly predictable noun, indicating they had knowledge of the 
phonological relationship.) In summary, non-natives sometimes, but not always, appear to 
predict syntactic information, but there is no evidence that they predict phonology.  These 
findings may reflect difficulty of predicting later stages of the production process.  
                                                 
8 In their replication of Martin et al. (2013), Ito et al. (2016) also found no evidence for 
prediction of phonology in non-native English speakers, but note that they found no evidence 
for native speakers either (see Footnote 5). 
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In addition, poor reading skills may impair or prevent prediction during spoken 
language comprehension. In a visual-world study, adults with high literacy fixated 
predictable target objects before they heard the object’s name but adults with low literacy did 
not (Mishra, Singh, Pandey, & Huettig, 2012).  Dutch adults with dyslexia predicted a target 
object after hearing a gender-marked article (which was followed by a gender-unmarked 
adjective), but did so more slowly than adults without dyslexia (Huettig & Brouwer, 2015). 
Moreover, listeners from both groups who had higher word-reading skills were more likely to 
predict the target object. Although the cause of this relationship is unclear, these results show 
that even native speakers differ in their prediction skills.  Moreover, children’s prediction 
skills are also related to their vocabulary (e.g., Mani & Huettig, 2012; Borovsky, Elman, & 
Fernald, 2012) or reading ability (Mani & Huettig, 2014). Finally, DeLong et al. (2012) 
replicated DeLong et al. (2005) with older adults but found no correlation between the ERP 
effect on the article (a/an) and the article’s Cloze probability (though the older adults showed 
effects on the noun), suggesting that they did not predict the noun form even though their 
comprehension of the sentence was otherwise intact (as indicated by the N400 effect on the 
noun)9.  
 In sum, several studies involving non-native speakers, adults with limited reading 
skills, children, and older adults suggest that these comprehenders do not always predict to 
the same extent as typical native young adults. While it is difficult to ascertain whether 
comprehension proceeds as rapidly or smoothly in these comprehenders as it does in typical 
native young adults, these findings show language comprehension can occur without 
prediction. At present, we do not know what makes less typical comprehenders less likely to 
engage in prediction, but it is possible that limited resources (e.g., in children or older adults) 
might contribute to these effects. In any case, together with the evidence that prediction-by-
production takes time and resources, these findings make a strong case for the optionality of 
prediction-by-production.  
 
Prediction-by-Association (2.5) 
 So far, we have discussed how comprehenders predict-by-production and our 
proposal is that prediction-by-production constitutes the most effective mechanism for 
prediction during language comprehension. We have described how the process of predicting 
by production is constrained by covert simulation of the speaker’s utterance and relies on 
computing the underlying intention (with adjustments) and eventually running that intention 
through the comprehender’s production system. We have also noted that comprehenders use 
prediction-by-production optionally, depending on whether time and resources allow. 
However, comprehenders also have another prediction mechanism at their disposal, one that 
is not based on production. 
 It is very likely that prediction is involved in the spreading of activation between 
related representations (Collins & Loftus, 1975), such as in semantic/associative or 
phonological priming. We have already mentioned in Section 1.2 that although priming of 
king by queen or thing may be explained in terms of integration, the most common 
explanation of such priming involves prediction.  According to such an explanation, 
encountering king leads to activation of the king representation, and hence activation very 
quickly (e.g., Perea & Gotor, 1997) spreads to representations that are linked to it (in long-
term memory), such as queen and thing. This spreading of activation is a form of prediction.  
                                                 
9 This finding should however be interpreted with caution given the difficulty with replicating 
the effect in younger adults (see footnote 5). 
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But the process by which activation spreads between different representations during 
priming is not compatible with prediction-by-production: It need not be constrained by covert 
imitation of the speaker’s utterance so far. For example, a speaker who utters king is unlikely 
to utter thing in close proximity, and a similar argument may be made for many items that are 
semantically related (e.g., shorts and tuxedo, both items of clothing but unlikely to be 
mentioned together).  To illustrate this point further, consider a visual-world study by 
Kukona, Fang, Aicher, Chen, and Magnuson (2011). They had participants hear utterances 
such as Bill will arrest …, while looking at pictures of a robber and a policeman (and 
unrelated characters).  Participants looked at both the policeman and the robber upon hearing 
arrest. It therefore appears that the word arrest activates, via the concept ARREST, both the 
concept POLICEMAN and the concept ROBBER, thus increasing the likelihood of fixations 
to the corresponding entities.  But note that the word policeman is incompatible with the 
linguistic context so far, as an agent for arrest has already been specified, and policeman is 
an unlikely continuation. This finding thus contrasts with Kamide et al. (2003a, Experiment 
3), where comprehenders’ predictions were instead constrained by the linguistic context so 
far.  It also serves to illustrate an interesting distinction between predicting a state of the 
world and predicting what the speaker will say (see Van Berkum, 2013). Listeners in Kukona 
et al. accurately predicted that the arresting event would involve a policeman and a robber, 
but they did not accurately predict order of mention. 
There is other evidence that comprehenders generate predictions that are not 
constrained by the linguistic context. Kamide et al. (2003a, Experiment 2) found that 
participants who heard The man will ride … (while looking at a display containing a 
motorbike, a carousel, a beer, and a candied apple) tended to fixate a motorbike more than 
participants who heard The girl will ride … or participants who heard The man will taste …..  
But in addition, participants who heard The girl will ride … tended to fixate the motorbike 
more than participants who heard The girl will taste. The latter finding suggests that the 
spreading of activation from RIDE is not limited to the set of concepts activated by the 
subject noun, in a way that contrasts with covert imitation of the context. Borovsky et al. 
(2012) found similar results with both adults and 3-10 year old children. In addition, Kukona, 
Cho, Magnuson, and Tabor (2014) found that participants looked at a white car after hearing 
The boy will eat the white, despite the fact that CAR is not compatible with the semantic 
representation of EAT. Finally, Sauppe (2016) found predictive looks to the agent in the 
verb-initial language Tagalog even when verb morphology indicated that the agent would not 
immediately follow the verb.  
To further illustrate the difference between prediction-by-association and prediction-
by-production, it is useful to consider how each mechanism would explain the findings from 
Altmann and Kamide (1999). An explanation of these findings in terms of prediction-by-
production would be as follows: Given sufficient time to process the scene (see Hintz et al., 
2017), the comprehender incorporates representations of the objects in the scene together 
with the covertly imitated utterance The boy will eat into the derived intention (because she 
assumes the speaker is describing the scene, which constitutes shared visual information); as 
a result, the derived intention involves the cake, but not one of the other objects in the scene, 
and also not something edible that is not in the scene. In contrast, prediction-by-association 
would explain the same findings as follows: Activation spreads very quickly from the 
representation of eat to representations for edible objects, such as the concept CAKE (as well 
as other concepts such as APPLE or STEAK).  The participant then looks to a location of an 
object with a matching conceptual representation, and the cake just happens to be the only 
matching object in the scene. 
In sum, there is some evidence that predictive looks in the visual-world paradigm are 
in part incompatible with covert imitation and thus with prediction-by-production. Such 
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evidence, together with evidence from semantic/associative and phonological priming, shows 
that comprehenders sometimes appear to activate a large network of semantically, 
associatively, or phonologically related items very rapidly, in what appears to be a largely 
unconstrained or undirected manner. In practice, this means that the representations that are 
predicted via spreading activation often do not correspond to the upcoming words. Moreover, 
as this type of activation also decays very rapidly (e.g., McNamara, 2005), even when the 
speaker does eventually produce the related word, it may well occur too late for the 
prediction to be useful. 
Given that the spreading of activation between linked representations in long-term 
memory is (presumably) resource-free (Neely & Kaan, 2001), this type of prediction could 
nevertheless still benefit comprehension.  For example, activation triggered by multiple 
lexical items could accumulate over time. One example of this may be the findings by 
Kamide et al. (2003a), following The man will ride. Activation of MAN would first result in 
the spreading of activation to associated concepts, such as MOTORBIKE (as well as BEER, 
as both concepts had corresponding pictures in the scene). When RIDE becomes activated, it 
also spreads activation to MOTORBIKE (as well as CAROUSEL), and this results in 
MOTORBIKE being activated more than either BEER or CAROUSEL, because of the 
summation of associations with the meanings of the subject and the verb. It is however 
unlikely that such summed associations could support prediction over longer utterances and 
across unrelated intervening words, and of course we have already reviewed examples of 
prediction that cannot be explained this way (see section 2.3.1 on covert imitation). 
Prediction-by-association may be largely automatic and as such constitutes a non-
optional prediction mechanism, one which is an inherent component of the process of 
language comprehension. Note that the form of spreading activation that leads to parallel 
activation of multiple semantically related concepts may well correspond to the initial stage 
of the semantic component of prediction-by-production. If so, it would be compatible with 
the widespread assumption that the semantic network is shared between production and 
comprehension (Gambi & Pickering, 2017). 
Patterns of spreading activation are based on the structure of the comprehender’s 
linguistic knowledge, which is in turn is based on experience comprehending language.  
Following Pickering and Garrod (2013), we therefore regard spreading activation as a form of 
prediction-by-association. The structure of the mental lexicon will of course constrain which 
parts of the network activation spreads to, but unlike in prediction-by-production the flow of 
activation does not need to be directional (from semantics, to syntax, and then to phonology). 
Crucially, the limitations of prediction via spreading activation (such as inaccuracy and decay 
rate) mean that it should play a comparatively small role in prediction (though there may be 
other forms of prediction-by-association which play a role in prediction; see Section 4.3). 
 
 
 
A Model of Prediction (2.6) 
We can now present our model of prediction (in relation to Figure 2). This model 
assumes that comprehenders have two mechanisms for prediction. The most important and 
effective, but optional, mechanism is prediction-by-production. In addition, comprehenders 
possess a less effective, but non-optional mechanism: prediction-by-association.  Prediction-
by-production depends on convert imitation and the process of constructing the derived 
intention. Although prediction can take place throughout an utterance (as illustrated in Figure 
1), Figure 2 focuses on prediction at one point in the interest of readability.  
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Figure 2.  An illustration of prediction-by-production and prediction-by-association. Boxes 
refer to processes; unboxed descriptions refer to representations. Solid lines indicate 
processes that are an integral part of comprehension; dashed lines are optional processes. At 
the top, the comprehender builds comprehension representations corresponding to the 
speaker’s utterance at time t0 using the comprehension implementer. Such representations are 
the basis for prediction-by-association, which leads to the pre-activation of several concepts 
(more strongly activated concepts are in bold). Comprehension representations also feed into 
the process of deriving the intention the comprehender would use to continue the utterance 
(derived intention at a later time t1) if she were speaking. To do so, the comprehender makes 
use of covert imitation of the linguistic context, takes non-linguistic context into account, and 
may apply contextual adjustments for differences between herself and the speaker. Then, the 
comprehender uses her production implementer to activate production representations 
corresponding to the predicted word robber, first in semantics (ROBBER), then in syntax 
(robberN, sing), and finally in phonology (/’rɑbə/). Square brackets around the set of predicted 
semantic, syntactic, and phonological representations indicate that prediction of syntax 
depends on prediction of semantics, and prediction of phonology in turn depends on 
prediction of syntax; note that predictions of later stages of production need not always occur, 
as indicated by the dashed arrows within the production implementer. The content of the box 
labelled production implementer depicts stages of the process of production, including 
activation of alternative concepts (GUNMAN) and lemmas (gunmanN, sing) that are ultimately 
abandoned.  
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As the speaker’s utterance unfolds, the comprehender incrementally constructs 
comprehension representations of phonology, syntax, and semantics, using the 
comprehension implementer (comprehension representations at t0 in the figure). Activation 
then spreads from these representations to associated representations at any of these levels via 
prediction-by-association.  The comprehender then turns the comprehension representations 
of the utterance so far into the representations that she would have constructed if she had 
produced the utterance, using covert imitation. She then derives the intention that she would 
use to continue the speaker’s utterance (derived intention at t1, see Figure 2) via a process of 
inverse mapping. In doing so, she takes into account not only the linguistic context (so far), 
but also the non-linguistic context, which includes shared background knowledge and shared 
visual (or other extra-linguistic) information. In addition, she may apply self-other 
adjustments to compensate for differences between the comprehender and the speaker in 
relation to memory for the linguistic context and access to the non-linguistic context (see 
section 3.3 for further discussion). 
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Once the comprehender has derived the intention that she would use to produce the 
next part of the utterance (e.g., sound, word, or phrase; derived intention at t1), she runs this 
derived intention through her production system to begin implementing the processes 
involved in speaking.  She can construct semantics, syntax, and phonology in order, or may 
stop after any of these levels.  She can also compute all stages of speaking, in which case she 
will complete the utterance (note this case is not depicted in Figure 2); this is of course what 
the comprehender does in the Cloze task when she produces a continuation and what she may 
do in dialogue when she completes her partner’s utterance (Lerner, 2002; see Section 3.5).  
To illustrate, consider predictions that may take place after comprehending When 
news broke about the break-in, John arrived and arrested the... Using prediction-by-
association, the comprehender initially predicts a large network of associated concepts, 
including locations such as BANK, JEWELLERS, and JAIL, instruments such as POLICE 
CAR, and event participants such as POLICEMAN, ROBBER, and GUNMAN.  Some of 
these predictions (more precisely, the words corresponding to these concepts) are compatible 
with possible continuations of the sentence.  But others are not; for example, POLICEMAN 
is a plausible agent of arrested, but its agent has already been specified (i.e., by the word 
John).  In addition, while locations and instruments (e.g., jail or police car) may be 
mentioned at some point, they are not required shortly after arrested, whereas a patient such 
as robber or gunman is required. Initially, the strength of the activation of any specific 
prediction depends on the strength and number of its associations with the context (i.e., on the 
structure of the semantic network), and particularly with the immediate context (because of 
the fast rate of decay of prediction-by-association). In Figure 2 we assume that at arrested the 
concepts POLICEMAN, ROBBER, and GUNMAN are more activated than any of the 
locations or instruments, and that POLICEMAN is activated to approximately the same 
extent as ROBBER or GUNMAN. Note that, although here we focus on semantics, these 
predictions may occur at any linguistic level.  These predictions-by-association are non-
optional – they are an inherent component of comprehending such a sentence. 
Crucially, the comprehender then can use prediction-by-production.  First, she 
covertly imitates what the speaker has said so far (the linguistic context), and combines this 
with an assessment of the non-linguistic context to construct the derived intention. In doing 
so, she may also take into account any differences between herself and the speaker (if she 
avoids egocentricity).  For example, she may realize that the speaker, like herself, can see a 
man carrying a gun (i.e., the shared visual context) or know that the speaker is particularly 
interested in firearms (i.e., a difference between herself and the speaker), and therefore 
incorporate this information into the derived intention.  She then uses this derived intention to 
begin the processes involved in producing a continuation.   
The comprehender rapidly focuses the semantic activation on the concepts associated 
with potential completions, with their degree of activation depending on the likelihood of 
them serving as part of the completion (see production implementer in Figure 2).  So at 
arrested, the concept ROBBER receives high activation, GUNMAN lower activation, but 
POLICEMAN now receives no activation, just like locations and instruments.  (If the non-
linguistic context supports GUNMAN, then it will of course receive higher activation than 
ROBBER.) Subject to time and resources, the comprehender implements more or less of the 
stages that would be involved in producing a completion.  So she may select the lemma 
robber (while dropping gunman), and construct its syntax (singular count noun) in around 
250ms and phonology /’rɑbə/ (or other aspects of its sound structure) in around 450ms. This 
example illustrates how prediction-by-association and prediction-by-production may be used 
in comprehending a single utterance.  We now apply this theory of prediction to a range of 
studies in language comprehension.  
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Prediction in Language Comprehension: A Theoretical Review (3) 
 
We now conduct a systematic review of studies of prediction and interpret them in 
terms of our theory. While Section 2 considered only evidence that unambiguously meets our 
methodological criteria for demonstrating prediction, Section 3 also considers studies that 
provide less clear evidence (i.e., that could be interpreted in terms of integration as well as in 
terms of prediction). We limit our discussion to studies for which a convincing case can be 
made that they should be interpreted in terms of prediction, and for those studies we carefully 
examine the arguments in favor of and against prediction.  In addition, for the sake of 
readability, we did not include every study that met our methodological criteria in Section 2, 
and we review these additional studies here to show they also support our proposal.  
We start by considering situations in which a comprehender processes language on its 
own, and does not produce language overtly. These are (1) electrophysiological (and related) 
studies of word processing in sentences (and texts), and (2) behavioral studies of reading, 
primarily involving eye-tracking.  We then consider (3) spoken language processing in the 
context of non-linguistic visual environments. After this, we turn to studies of (4) speech 
processing and (5) dialogue.  At the end of this section, we consider prediction in different 
populations (6), such as non-native speakers, children, and older adults. Many of these 
studies use stimuli that become more or less predictable at a critical point and measure 
predictability using the Cloze procedure (see section 1.1).   
 
Electrophysiological (and Other Neuroscientific) Studies (3.1) 
Much evidence for prediction comes from electrophysiological studies, in particular 
event-related potentials (ERPs).  The ERP literature has paid particularly close attention to 
the prediction of words.  For example, Van Petten and Luka (2012) acknowledged that 
comprehenders may predict semantics, but restricted their review to the prediction for “a 
specific word (lexical item) to occur in the future” (p. 179).  In contrast, our interest is in 
prediction at different levels of representation (section 2.1).  In fact, we have already 
discussed several ERP studies that demonstrate prediction at different levels (semantics: 
Grisoni et al., 2017; syntax: Wicha et al., 2004, Van Berkum et al., 2005, form: De Long et 
al., 2005, Ito et al., 2017, Kim & Lai, 2012; see section 2.1).  
Each of those studies shows effects of a predictable representation before that 
representation could have been activated bottom-up.  We now review additional studies that 
also show such effects but where we cannot be clear which specific representation was 
predicted (section 3.1.1). Then, we review findings that need not be due to prediction, 
because they measure on the target word and the timing of the effects is such that they could 
have occurred as a result of bottom-up processing, but where additional considerations 
(specific to each study) suggest that they are in fact due to prediction (section 3.1.2).  
We exclude studies for which an interpretation based on integration is at least as 
likely as one based on prediction. These include many studies that looked at the N400 
response to a target word and which draw on the fact that this response is greater for a less 
predictable than a more predictable word (Kutas & Hillyard, 1984).  This relationship is 
extremely strong (Wlotko and Federmeier [2012b] reported an inverse correlation of .9 at the 
grand average level.) But as we pointed out in section 1.2, the reduced N400 for predictable 
words may reflect ease of integration (Neville, Kutas, Chesney, & Schmidt, 1986; Kutas, 
Hillyard, & Gazzaniga, 1988). For example, studies of listening show that N400 effects due 
to unpredictable words are time-locked to when they diverge phonetically from the 
predictable word (Connolly & Phillips, 1994; Van Petten, Coulson, Rubin, Plante, & Parks, 
1999; Van Den Brink, Brown, & Hagoort, 2001), suggesting such N400 effects may reflect 
prediction of word forms (i.e., specified for sounds).  But it is equally possible that 
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participants use the sounds to activate the words (“bottom up”), and these are then integrated 
more or less easily with the context. 
 Another example of a study that may appear to demonstrate prediction but is in fact 
compatible with integration is Maess, Mamashli, Obleser, Helle, and Friederici (2016). Using 
MEG, they found that, while the magnitude of the N400 at the noun was larger for less 
predictable (Cloze <25%) than more predictable (Cloze >50%) nouns, the magnitude of the 
N400 at the verb was larger for verbs in more constraining contexts (e.g., He conducts the 
orchestra) than less constraining ones (He leads the orchestra).  Moreover, there were strong 
negative correlations between the magnitude of the neural activation at the verb and at the 
noun (across a range of left temporal areas and the parahippocampus), which could suggest 
that in more constraining contexts participants pre-activated the upcoming noun and that this 
then facilitated later processing of the noun. However, constraining verbs may elicit stronger 
activation because they are semantically richer, rather than because they facilitate pre-
activation of the nouns; this would make the finding compatible with integration. 
Studies such as Connolly and Phillips (1994) and Maess et al. (2016) are thus 
excluded from our review. But many other EEG and neuroscientific studies are included and 
show how much of the literature can be interpreted in terms of our model. We conclude the 
section by arguing that neuroscientific evidence supports prediction-by-production (section 
3.1.3). This conclusion is compatible with Federmeier (2007), who also proposed (largely on 
the basis of evidence from hemispheric differences) that ERP evidence supports the use of 
production mechanisms during prediction (see also DeLong, Groppe, Urbach, & Kutas, 2012; 
Federmeier, Kutas, & Schul, 2010; Federmeier, Wlotko, De Ochoa-Dewald, & Kutas, 2007).   
 
Electrophysiological studies demonstrating prediction but not the level of 
prediction. (3.1.1) Some studies unambiguously demonstrate prediction but do not reveal 
which level of representation is predicted.  In an MEG study, Fruchter et al. (2015) had 
participants read adjective-noun pairs, in which the adjective was either highly or weakly 
predictive of the noun (e.g., economic is highly predictive of growth but weakly predictive of 
reform), and in which the (more or less) predictable noun was more or less frequent. They 
found increased activity in the left middle temporal gyrus (left MTG) just before presentation 
of a lower (vs. higher) frequency noun, but only when the adjective was highly predictive of 
the noun. When the adjective was weakly predictive of the noun, the frequency effect 
occurred only after presentation of the noun. Thus, participants may have used the adjective 
to predict a specific noun.  The MTG has been associated with lexical access in 
comprehension (e.g., Lau, Phillips, & Poeppel, 2008) and, importantly, production (e.g., 
Indefrey & Levelt, 2004). However, the locus of frequency effects in word production (e.g., 
Jescheniak & Levelt, 1994; Caramazza, Costa, Miozzo, & Bi, 2001) or comprehension 
(Dahan, Magnuson, & Tanenhaus, 2001) is unclear and so we do not know whether Fruchter 
et al.’s study showed prediction of syntax or form.  
Dikker and Pylkkänen (2011) showed participants a picture followed by a noun 
phrase that matched (or mismatched) the specific item in the picture (e.g., an apple) or the 
semantic field (e.g., a collection of food). They found an M100 effect in visual cortex when 
the noun phrase matched the specific item but not the semantic field. As the effect is so rapid, 
and it occurs in visual cortex, it must involve prediction (see Dikker et al., 2010). This 
conclusion was further supported by a reanalysis of Dikker and Pylkkänen (2011) conducted 
by Dikker and Pylkkänen (2013). They analyzed MEG responses before the target noun 
phrase.  Because trials followed a rigid structure, participants presumably became aware 
when the target would appear.  Just before it occurred, there was activation of left mid-
temporal cortex followed by activation of visual cortex (as well as activation of ventro-
medial prefrontal cortex) in the specific item versus the semantic field context.  These 
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findings suggest that people predicted the noun (its semantics) followed by its (visual) form, 
at the moment that was appropriate to facilitate processing of the noun. However, we can 
only infer this process indirectly from the localization of the activation, and so we cannot be 
sure what aspect of the linguistic representation of the noun was predicted.  
Similarly, Boylan, Trueswell, and Thompson-Schill (2014) had participants read 
contexts that predicted either noun or verbs. Using fMRI, they examined activation of visual 
areas before the target word was presented, while participants were instructed to look for an 
appropriate word among a random pattern of dots. Activation in the so-called visual-form 
area differentiated between contexts predicting a noun and those predicting a verb, suggesting 
that participants predicted visual characteristics of the typical orthography of different 
syntactic categories. However, once again we can only infer what is being predicted using 
localization; it is possible that participants predicted syntax, but it is also possible that they 
predicted some other characteristic that differs systematically between their nouns and verbs 
(e.g., aspects of semantics that may lead to differences in mental imagery). 
Electrophysiological studies supporting but not demonstrating prediction. (3.1.2) 
In Federmeier and Kutas (1999), participants read high-cloze contexts such as They wanted to 
make the hotel look more like a tropical resort.  So along the driveway they planted rows of 
… They then read the predictable word (palms), a semantically (i.e., categorically) related 
and unpredictable word (pines), or a semantically unrelated and unpredictable word (tulips). 
The presentation rate, as is typical for most ERP studies of reading, was fairly slow (SOA of 
500ms). The N400 was reduced for the highly predictable palms compared to the 
unpredictable tulips.  More importantly, it was also reduced for pines versus tulips (see also 
Federmeier, McLennan, Ochoa, & Kutas, 2002), despite the fact that both words were 
unpredictable (and also less plausible than the predictable palms). In addition, the N400 
reduction for related unpredictable versus unrelated unpredictable words was greater in a very 
constraining context (90% Cloze) than a less constraining context (59% Cloze), suggesting 
that the effect depended on the predictability of palms.   
Since these effects occurred after the predictable or a related word was encountered and 
processed for meaning, it is possible that the reduced N400 at pines was due to ease-of-
integration. On this account, when participants encountered pines, they would have activated 
the corresponding concept PINES, which in turn would have activated PALMS (or some of 
its features), and the activation of PALMS would then have led to the N400 reduction, as 
PALMS integrates better with the context. However, the related unpredictable word pines 
was not a strong lexical associate of palms, so it is unlikely than PINES activated PALMS 
directly. It is instead more likely that participants predicted a feature (or features) common to 
both pines and palms (e.g., HAS-TRUNK, +TROPICAL), or the common category TREE.  
We can explain Federmeier and Kutas’s (1999) results in terms of prediction-by-
production. Comprehenders first predicted HAS-TRUNK or TREE, and activation spread to 
related concepts. A speaker producing the sentence would also go through these stages, and 
then strongly activate the concept PALMS and more weakly activate other concepts, 
including PINES (but also other trees and tropical plants).  A comprehender might similarly 
activate the concept PALMS most strongly but also activate PINES, leading to the N400 
reduction for related words observed by Federmeier and Kutas (1999).  
In a study based on Federmeier and Kutas, but using auditory rather than written stimuli, 
Romero-Rivas, Martin, and Costa (2016) manipulated whether the stimuli were spoken in a 
foreign accent or not. Listeners who listened to accented speech showed no reduction in the 
N400 for the related compared to the unrelated word, in contrast to participants who listened 
to non-accented speech.  It is not clear whether the foreign accent caused participants to 
predict less or instead to make different predictions (e.g., just of the predictable word), but in 
any case these findings are compatible with the optionality of prediction-by-production 
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(section 2.4).  Moreover, using a 500ms SOA, Wlotko and Federmeier (2015) replicated 
Federmeier and Kutas’s (1999) finding of N400 reduction to unpredictable related words 
compared to unpredictable and unrelated words.  But when they used a 250ms SOA, they 
found a smaller reduction for unpredictable related words. Hence, this finding also supports 
the optionality of prediction-by-production: Specifically, it shows that even semantic 
prediction takes time.10   
Metusalem et al. (2012) had participants read a description of an event in which kids 
went outside after a blizzard that ended with They spent the whole day outside building a big 
…. They found a reduced N400 both for a predictable final word snowman (81% Cloze) but 
also for an event-relevant but unpredictable (0% Cloze) and implausible word (jacket).  Since 
jacket was not strongly associated with the words in the context or with the predictable word 
snowman (at least not more than the control word towel), an integration explanation is 
unlikely. Instead, the context likely activated the event structure representation “playing 
outside in the cold”; from this, activation spread to related concepts, including JACKET.   
 Now, let us briefly contrast these results with Federmeier and Kutas (1999). The two 
studies are superficially similar (they both show N400-reduction for unpredictable and 
implausible words).  But in Methusalem et al. (2012), JACKET was not activated because of 
its relationship to the predicted concept SNOWMAN.  Instead, comprehenders activated the 
snowman-building event non-predictively and this in turn led to activation of JACKET via 
prediction-by-association (i.e., from the event structure or schema).  Importantly, a speaker 
would not pre-activate the word jacket and so a comprehender would not predict jacket using 
production mechanisms. Note that Amsel, DeLong, and Kutas (2015) replicated Metusalem 
et al.’s (2012) finding (while controlling for plausibility).  They also showed a reduced N400 
for words that had a perceptuo-motor relationship with both the predicted word and the 
context.  Comprehenders therefore activate perceptuo-motor aspects of semantics (and not 
merely abstract features; see also Grisoni et al., 2017). Amsel et al.’s effects may be due to 
the relationship between the target word and the predicted word (i.e., involving prediction-
by-production) or the target word and the context (i.e., involving prediction-by-association).    
In discussing Federmeier and Kutas (1999), we noted that comprehenders might 
predict semantic features (e.g., HAS-TRUNK, +TROPICAL) or the conceptual category 
TREE.  Thornhill and Van Petten (2012) replaced Federmeier and Kutas’s pines condition 
with a near-synonym of the predicted word.  Specifically, they had more predictive contexts 
(78% Cloze; e.g., On his vacation, he got some much needed) or less predictive contexts 
(30% Cloze) followed by the most predictable word (rest), a near-synonym (relaxation), or 
an unrelated word (sun).  As expected, the near-synonyms led to a smaller N400 than the 
unrelated word (with the reduction being greater in the more predictive contexts).  More 
importantly, in predictive contexts, there was an enhanced late (post-N400) frontal positivity 
for near-synonyms and unrelated words compared to predictable words. This finding suggests 
that comprehenders predict conceptual representations of highly predictable words, and do 
not merely predict semantic features (which greatly overlap between words and their near-
synonyms).  Therefore these results are compatible with production models in which lemmas 
are linked to unitary concepts (e.g., Levelt et al., 1999; contra Dell, 1986; Bierwisch & 
Schreuder, 1992).  The authors interpret this late effect as indicating disconfirmation of the 
prediction (e.g., encountering relaxation rather than the predicted rest); see Section 4.4.   
 Another study suggests prediction of semantic features associated with shape.  
Rommers, Meyer, Praamstra, and Huettig (2013) presented participants with high-constraint 
                                                 
10 Note that the N400 reduction was not diminished at the shorter SOA of 250ms if 
participants experienced the 500ms SOA before the 250ms SOA, perhaps because they were 
able to recruit additional resources to predict more quickly. 
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contexts (e.g., about the lunar landing; average Cloze of 72%) followed by the predictable 
word (moon), an unpredictable word referring to an object related in shape to the predictable 
object (tomato), or an unpredictable and unrelated word from the same category as the shape-
related word (rice).  The negative wave in the shape-related condition was smaller than in the 
unpredictable condition.  The effect occurred later (500-700ms) than the standard N400, a 
finding which may reflect the fact that N400 effects often occur late in auditory experiments. 
In addition, an explanation in terms of prediction is supported by the fact that Rommers et al. 
also conducted a visual world experiment, which showed that people look at shape-related 
competitors before they hear the predictable word. 
A Polish study relating to both semantics and syntax (Szewczyk & Schriefers, 2013) 
may be interpreted as showing that people predict animacy. This study used discourse 
contexts that constrained towards an animate or inanimate noun, and were either highly 
constraining toward a specific noun (Cloze: 89%) or less so (Cloze: 32%).  The noun was 
preceded by an adjective that was marked for animacy. This adjective elicited a smaller N400 
when it was compatible with the discourse context than when it was not. Since the effect did 
not depend on the predictability of a specific noun, it is possible that participants simply 
found it easier to integrate the adjective whose animacy was more compatible with the 
context. However, it is likely that comprehenders predicted animacy independent of a specific 
word (in our terms, that they predicted +ANIMATE), or alternatively that different 
comprehenders predicted different individual animate concepts rather than all animate 
concepts together. In addition, the study suggested that comprehenders predicted a syntactic 
feature (the animacy marking), because the effect depended on the syntactic match versus 
mismatch (cf. Wicha et al., 2004).  This relationship between semantic and syntactic 
prediction (i.e., a link between levels) is of course compatible with prediction-by-production.   
Kwon, Sturt, and Liu (2017) had Mandarin speakers read highly constraining sentence 
contexts (85% Cloze) followed by either the predictable noun, a related but unpredictable 
noun, or an unrelated noun. As in Federmeier and Kutas (1999), the related noun elicited a 
smaller N400 than the unrelated noun, an effect which we interpreted as showing prediction 
of the predictable noun. Moreover, the nouns were always preceded by a classifier. 
Importantly, when the classifier was not appropriate for the predictable noun, it elicited an 
N400 whose amplitude was smaller for classifiers congruent with related than unrelated 
nouns. Since Mandarin classifiers carry (some) semantic content, the effect on the classifier 
may reflect integration of the classifier with the preceding context, but it is more likely that it 
reflects pre-activation of the noun before the noun position (similarly to the animacy effect in 
Szewczyk & Schriefers, 2013).  
Kim and Gilley (2013) had participants read ungrammatical sentences such as The 
thief was caught by for police and grammatical controls.  For half of the participants, the 
ungrammaticality always resulted from the word for; for the other half, it resulted from one of 
seven words (at, of, on, for, from, over, with).  For both groups, ungrammatical stimuli led to 
a negative deflection 170-270ms post-stimulus (an “N170”), which is compatible with 
integration because it did not occur early enough to rule out bottom-up processing.11  But, in 
                                                 
11 In a related study, Lau, Stroud, Plesch, and Phillips (2006) found that early 
syntactic anomaly effects (after around 200ms) were affected by whether the linguistic 
context predicted one particular syntactic category (99% Cloze for that syntactic category) for 
the upcoming word or was compatible with different syntactic categories.  Specifically, an 
unpredictable preposition led to a stronger early anomaly effect if the context predicted a 
noun than if it was compatible with more than one syntactic category.  But the effect did not 
occur early enough to rule out the possibility that comprehenders had time to access the 
syntactic category of the preposition and try to integrate it with the preceding context 
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addition, only the low-variability group showed a positive deflection 125-145ms post-
stimulus (a “P1”) that was localized to part of occipital cortex.  It is just possible that the 
latter effect also reflects rapid bottom-up processing of a very frequent word that was 
repeatedly encountered in the experiment. However, it is more likely that participants in the 
low-variability group learned to predict the word for, including aspects of its form (e.g., its 
shape) at the critical sentence position, and determined whether this prediction matched 
visual input (similarly to Kim & Lai, 2012; see section 2.1). Similarly, Söderström, Horne, 
Frid and Roll (2016) investigated an early negativity elicited by word stem accents in 
Swedish and showed that its amplitude correlated with the predictability of the suffix that 
followed the stem.   
Laszlo and Federmeier (2009) conducted a similar experiment to Federmeier and 
Kutas (1999), except that they used stimuli that were orthographically rather than 
semantically related to the most likely completion.  As well as the predictable (89% Cloze) 
word (e.g., bank), they used an orthographic neighbor that was a word (bark), a 
(pronounceable) pseudoword (pank), or an illegal letter string (bxnk).  For all three types of 
neighbors, the N400 amplitude was reduced in comparison to matched non-neighbors.  As 
with Federmeier and Kutas, it is possible that this facilitation occurred because neighbors of 
the predictable word activated this word bottom-up and this word then integrated more easily 
with the context. But their data are more consistent with a predictive interpretation that is 
very similar to the one that we proposed for Federmeier and Kutas:  Comprehenders 
predicted the semantics of the predictable word and then the predicted semantics led to 
activation of the predicted orthographic form. The predicted orthographic form subsequently 
facilitated processing of the orthographic neighbors of the predicted word, and these in turn 
provided support for the semantics of the predicted word (even though that word never 
occurred), which explains the reduced N400.  Note that, if the effect were limited to words, it 
could be that people predicted orthographically related words without predicting orthographic 
representations; activation could spread from bank to bark without activation of b, a, or k, as 
long as orthographically similar words are linked to one another in the lexical network. 
However, the fact that the effect occurred with non-words (without lexical entries) suggests 
that comprehenders rather predicted individual graphemes from semantics (of the predicted 
word), in accord with the directionality of prediction-by-production (i.e., semantics to 
form).12 
 Finally, Ito, Corley, Pickering, Martin, and Nieuwland (2016) investigated both words 
related in form to a highly predictable word (Cloze: 94%) and words related in meaning to 
that word, in experiments that used a 500ms/word or a 700ms/word presentation rate.  
Meaning-related words led to a reduced N400 (relative to unrelated words) at both 
                                                 
(particularly as prepositions are very high-frequency words, and lexical access may proceed 
more rapidly than for typical open-class words).  
 
12 Vissers, Chwilla, and Kolk (2006) found that a misspelt word whose pronunciation 
is identical to a highly predictable word (e.g., boekun for boeken, ‘books’; Cloze: 91%) 
elicited a P600 ERP effect, but this effect did not occur when the word was less predictable 
(Cloze: 0%).  This finding is compatible with prediction of phonological (or orthographic) 
form, but it may of course reflect reanalysis as a consequence of integration difficulty. They 
also found an earlier effect (a N270) during comprehension of misspelt words, but this is not 
sufficiently early to rule out bottom-up activation, and it occurred only when the word was 
less predictable (cf. Newman & Connolly, 2004), which is difficult to reconcile with an 
explanation in terms of prediction. 
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presentation rates, but form-related words led to a reduced N400 (relative to unrelated words) 
only at the slower presentation rate.  These findings suggest that comprehenders did not have 
the time (or resources) to predict form at the faster presentation rate.  They therefore support 
the optionality of prediction-by-production. Note that Laszlo and Federmeier (2009) did find 
evidence for form-based prediction at a 500ms SOA. However, it is difficult to make direct 
comparisons between studies using different items: Even if the Cloze values for the target 
word are similar, the target may become predictable earlier in one study than another, which 
may in turn allow more rapid form-based predictions.   
Does the electrophysiological evidence support prediction-by-production? (3.1.3) 
We have now reviewed a large number of ERP studies (both here and in section 2.1) that 
either demonstrate prediction or can be interpreted in terms of prediction. We argue these 
studies support our model and specifically our proposal that the most important mechanism 
for prediction during comprehension is prediction-by-production. First, the vast majority of 
studies show that comprehenders predict continuations that are constrained by the linguistic 
context so far and fit with the derived intention. We discussed a single study (Metusalem et 
al., 2012) that is not compatible with this conclusion, as it showed comprehenders predicted a 
word which was not a plausible continuation for the sentence context (build a….jacket). This 
study therefore provides evidence for prediction-by-association. But the bulk of the evidence 
supports prediction-by-production. 
Second, many of the studies suggest that comprehenders predict semantics and, on the 
basis of a predicted semantic representation, activate representations at other processing 
levels which follow on from semantics during language production. Some studies show that 
predicted semantics can lead to the activation of syntax (Van Berkum et al., 2005; Wicha et 
al., 2004; Otten et al., 2007; Otten & Van Berkum, 2008) and others provide more or less 
definitive evidence that predicted semantics can lead to activation of form (DeLong et al., 
2005; Ito et al., 2017; Kim & Lai, 2012; Dikker & Pylkkänen, 2011, 2013; Fruchter et al., 
2015; Laszlo & Federmeier, 2009). Moreover, predicted syntax can also lead to the activation 
of form (Dikker et al., 2010; and perhaps Boylan et al., 2014, Kim & Gilley, 2013). Taken 
together, these findings support prediction-by-production, as they show that comprehenders’ 
predictions are compatible with a directional flow of information, proceeding from semantics, 
to syntax, and then to form. 
Finally, Ito et al.’s (2016) finding that semantic prediction occurred at a faster SOA 
compared to prediction of form supports prediction-by-production as it suggests that 
predictions involving later production stages take longer than earlier production stages. In 
sum, electrophysiological and neuroscientific evidence supports prediction-by-production.  
 
Eye-Tracking (and Other Behavioral) Studies of Reading (3.2) 
We now consider the evidence for prediction in studies of reading.  We first discuss 
how parafoveal preview relates to prediction of upcoming words (3.2.1).  We then argue that 
the way in which readers plan eye movements strongly suggests that they predict processing 
difficulty before lexical access occurs (3.2.2), and propose that eye-tracking evidence for 
prediction is consistent with prediction-by-production (3.2.3).  Finally, we address the 
broader language comprehension literature that suggests that readers predict syntactic and 
semantic properties of sentences (3.2.4). 
Prediction and preview. (3.2.1) It is well known that readers preview upcoming text: 
They take in spaces between words well ahead of the point of fixation, and to a lesser extent 
information about letter shape, orthographic and phonological regularity, and lexical 
information (e.g., Hohenstein & Kliegl, 2014). These preview effects of course do not 
demonstrate prediction, as previewed information is part of the input. Readers also skip more 
predictable words (typically after they fixate toward the end of the previous word) more often 
 35 
than less predictable words (Balota, Pollatsek, & Rayner, 1985; Rayner et al., 2011; Rayner 
& Well, 1996).  This effect must be due to processing before the target word is fixated, but it 
could be due to preview of the target word.  In fact, in Balota et al., the context was constant 
across conditions and the target word varied; thus, the reader must (logically) have taken in 
some information about the target word while fixating a previous word and so the skipping 
effect may be due to integration of previewed information.  In Rayner et al., the context 
varied and the target word was constant.  In this study, readers could have predicted the target 
word more in the more predictive (70% Cloze or higher) context than the less predictive 
(17% Cloze or lower) context.  However, the effect could equally well be due to integration 
of previewed information about the target word with the context. Moreover, Drieghe, Rayner, 
and Pollatsek (2005) used a contingent-change paradigm in which a different word or non-
word initially appeared in the location of a predictable target word (64% Cloze).  This 
stimulus changed into the target word when an eye movement left the pre-target word.  
Participants skipped the target word more often when the target word did not change than 
when it did.  This finding indicates that participants process predictable words, at least to 
some extent, before they fixate them, and hence means that word skipping, by itself, does not 
demonstrate prediction. To do so, it would be necessary to show that skipping was more 
likely for more predictable than less predictable words that cannot be previewed.  To our 
knowledge, this effect has not been found. 
Predictability, frequency, and the familiarity check. (3.2.2) Very roughly, readers 
of English and languages with similar orthographies tend to fixate on most words for roughly 
200-250ms, and then typically perform a rapid saccadic eye movement to the next word 
(though some words are fixated more than once).  They primarily take in information about 
the fixated word, and are affected very rapidly by its characteristics (e.g., font, spelling, 
frequency, or contextual plausibility; Rayner, 1998).  As already noted (section 1.1), readers 
fixate less predictable words for longer than more predictable words (Ehrlich & Rayner, 
1981; Rayner, Slattery, Drieghe, & Liversedge, 2011; Rayner & Well, 1996).  Moreover, 
their first fixations on infrequent words are longer than on frequent words (e.g., Inhoff & 
Rayner, 1986).  It might appear that such first-fixation effects could be due to integration 
rather than prediction because the effect is measured on the predictable word itself (and this 
word may even have been processed during the previous fixation, in studies that allow 
preview) and first fixations are longer than lexical access time.  
But there is a problem with this explanation: Readers need 175-200ms to program 
their saccades (Rayner, Slowiaczek, Clifton, & Bertera, 1983).  Such planning therefore takes 
place early in a fixation.  Now, the two most comprehensive and implemented models of eye 
movement behavior during reading (E-Z Reader, e.g.,  Reichle, Pollatsek, Fisher, & Rayner, 
1998; and SWIFT, e.g., Engbert, Nuthmann, Richter, & Kliegl, 2005) assume that word 
frequency affects saccade programming. In other words, the reader must have access to 
frequency information well before they could have extracted that information bottom-up.  It 
therefore appears that frequency affects the decision to move the eye well before readers get 
to the point in lexical access at which frequency exerts an influence. 
In particular, the E-Z Reader model provides a formalized account of this process.  
Readers use high spatial frequency information to perform a rapid “familiarity check” (L1 
stage).  They then use the result of this check, together with low spatial frequency 
information about word boundaries, to plan a saccade.  At this point, the plan is labile (i.e., 
subject to change).  The reader then continues to lexical access (L2 stage) and contextual 
integration, and sometimes uses the result of this integration to change the saccadic plan.  In 
other words, the saccade typically depends on the familiarity check, but can be affected by 
subsequent processing (e.g., if the sentence becomes ungrammatical or implausible).   
 36 
The familiarity check could be explained without prediction if apparent frequency 
effects were actually due to form properties that correlate with frequency, such as 
orthographic familiarity.  White (2008) found some evidence of a small effect of orthographic 
familiarity on first-fixation time (and later measures), suggesting some direct effect of 
orthography on saccade planning.  But she found robust frequency effects on first-fixation 
time when orthographic familiarity was controlled.  So early frequency effects cannot be 
explained by properties of the word that are independent of lexical access.  Readers must 
therefore regularly plan their movement before lexical access, but in a way that appears to be 
affected by frequency. For this to be possible, they must predict word frequency. 
There is another way in which frequency effects in reading suggest a role for 
prediction.  It is known that predictability and frequency independently affect average 
fixation times (e.g., Rayner, Ashby, Pollatsek, & Reichle, 2004; Kretzschmar, Schlesewsky, 
& Staub, 2015).13  They also independently affect distributions of fixations: They both 
influence the central tendency of the distribution of fixations (i.e., the µ-parameter in an ex-
Gaussian distribution) but only frequency influences the distribution’s right tail (i.e., the τ-
parameter). This latter finding occurs because low frequency words sometimes lead to 
abnormally long fixations (e.g., Staub, White, Drieghe, Hollway, & Rayner, 2010), but 
unpredictable words do not (e.g., Staub, 2011).  To the extent that frequency effects at least 
partly reflect processing that takes place after encountering a word, the finding that 
predictability effects are independent of frequency effects provides some support for the 
claim that the effects of predictability reflect processing that takes place before encountering 
a word – in other words, prediction. 14 
Parallel lexical predictions. (3.2.3) Traditionally, most researchers assume that 
readers can predict only a single word (serial prediction).  If so, there should be a linear 
relationship between reading time and degree of predictability (see Schotter, Lee, Reiderman, 
& Rayner, 2015).  But in fact fixation times differ much more between low-Cloze (4%) and 
medium-Cloze (41%) contexts than between medium- and high-Cloze (86%) contexts (e.g., 
Rayner & Well, 1996).  Moreover, Smith and Levy (2013) estimated word predictability in a 
corpus using trigram probabilities extracted from a much larger corpus, and compared these 
results with reading times.  After controlling for factors such as word length and frequency, 
they found a logarithmic relationship between reading time and predictability on both the 
target word and the following word, for predictability values from 1 down to 10-6.  (They 
found similar results using self-paced reading, except that the effects were delayed, occurring 
on the following three words but not the target word.)   
Smith and Levy’s (2013) findings are compatible with Rayner and Well (1996), but in 
addition they found that reading times were slower for extremely unlikely words than very 
unlikely words – in itself a quite remarkable result. Their results are incompatible with serial 
                                                 
13 Note that Kretzschmar et al. (2015) found effects of predictability but no effects of 
frequency on the N400 in an ERP experiment that was parallel to their eye-tracking study.  
This difference (which is consistent with an extensive literature) means that the different 
methods are sensitive to different processes.  
14 A large self-paced reading study also found support for this conclusion (Brothers, Swaab, 
& Traxler, 2017). Participants read predictable and unpredictable target words in the context 
of experimental lists that contained lower or higher proportions of predictable words. The 
target words also varied in frequency. While the frequency effect was unaffected, the 
predictability effect was larger when the proportion of sentences completed by predictable 
words was higher, suggesting that predictability effects may be generated by a different 
process than the one that is responsible for frequency effects. 
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prediction and they argued that comprehenders predict a very large set of words (i.e., at least 
including words that would occur once in 100,000).   
These findings are not unambiguously due to prediction (rather than integration), but 
are in any case compatible with prediction-by-production. Although a reader using 
prediction-by-production would ultimately predict the semantic representation of a single 
word (just as a speaker eventually selects a single lemma), she would first activate a whole 
network of semantic representations, which in turn lead to the activation of many lemmas.  
Therefore, prediction-by-production is compatible with parallel activation of concepts and 
lemmas.   
Prediction during sentence processing. (3.2.4) Traditional theories of how 
comprehenders syntactically analyze and interpret sentences have been framed in terms of 
incremental processing and its limits (e.g., Frazier, 1987; MacDonald, Pearlmutter, & 
Seidenberg, 1994).  More recent accounts make use of the notions of prediction and 
predictability (e.g., Levy, 2008; see Section 1.1.1).  Many important findings that are 
explained in terms of prediction are equally compatible with integration (e.g., Chow et al., 
2016), but some provide clearer evidence for prediction. 
Gibson’s (1998) influential Syntactic Prediction Locality Theory of linguistic 
complexity proposed that “the longer a predicted category must be kept in memory before the 
prediction is satisfied, the greater is the cost for maintaining that prediction” (abstract, p. 1).  
For example, Chen, Gibson, and Wolf (2005) found that readers had particular difficulty with 
the underlined phrase in The realization that the implication that the company planned the 
layoff was not just a rumor caused a panic.  On Gibson’s account, the difficulty occurs 
because readers have predicted that two verbs are still required.  In support of this proposal, 
the same phrase was easier to process in otherwise similar sentences in which no verbs were 
required (The employee realized that the boss implied that the company planned the layoff 
…).  Similar findings occur for Japanese, a language with different orders of verbs and noun 
phrases (Nakatani & Gibson, 2010). These results are compatible with our proposal that 
prediction-by-production is resource intensive (section 2.4). 
Boland, Tanenhaus, Garnsey, and Carlson (1995) had participants read a sentence 
word-by-word and simultaneously judge if it made sense (i.e., they pressed “yes” or “no” as 
each word appeared).  In one experiment, participants often judged sentences such as Which 
car salesmen did Harriet distribute the science exam papers to in class? as not making sense 
before the preposition to (in contrast to equivalent plausible sentences).  As verbs such as 
distribute require a prepositional object including the preposition to, participants must have 
predicted this preposition in order to determine car salesmen was an implausible recipient of 
distribute.  Similarly, participants did not judge Which movie did the girl remind … as less 
plausible than Which child did the girl remind … (whereas they did judge Which stone did the 
assistant watch … as less plausible than Which star did the assistant watch …).  They appear 
to have considered an interpretation in which remind introduces a clause (e.g., which movie 
did the girl remind them to watch?).  To do this, they must have predicted a clause containing 
a verb for which movie is a plausible object (see also Altmann, 1999).  Pickering and Traxler 
(2001) found similar effects in normal reading, thus ruling out the possibility that such 
prediction depends on the stop-making-sense paradigm.  In conclusion, these results appear to 
require prediction of a specific word (to) or types of words (contextually plausible transitive 
verbs such as watch after which movie did the girl remind …). 
Staub and Clifton (2006) found that reading or the subway was faster following the 
team took either the train … than following the team took the train ….  They argued that 
without either, readers assumed that the train was the complete object of took and therefore 
had to reanalyze when they encountered or the subway.  But either led them to predict a 
conjoined object (i.e., or followed by another noun phrase).  An integration account (i.e., that 
 38 
either makes a conjoined object predictable but not predicted) is unlikely because it would 
require reanalysis to occur both with and without either, but for the reanalysis with either to 
be unproblematic.  Even if comprehenders predicted meaning (i.e., disjunction) or the word 
or, they presumably predicted syntactically as well. 
 A particular concern about investigations of the prediction of syntactic structure is 
that the interpretation of results as predictive or not often depends on syntactic assumptions.  
To give one example, Traxler and Pickering (1996) found that readers experienced difficulty 
with That’s the garage with which the heartless killer shot the hapless man yesterday 
afternoon at the verb shot.  According to theories based on transformational grammar, readers 
associate the filler with which with an empty category after man before they can interpret the 
sentence.  So the effect at shot means that they predicted this empty category (Gibson & 
Hickok, 1993).  But in a linguistic theory without empty categories, the filler is directly 
associated with the verb and no prediction is necessary (Pickering & Barry, 1991). Even if a 
study demonstrates some form of prediction, its characterization may depend on linguistic 
assumptions (e.g., in studies of ellipsis; Yoshida, Dickey, & Sturt, 2013).  In sum, it appears 
that syntactic structure is predicted during sentence processing, but it is difficult to draw 
specific conclusions in the absence of clear agreement about the nature of parsing.15   
 
Prediction Involving Non-Linguistic Contexts (3.3) 
Comprehenders can quickly integrate non-linguistic and linguistic information, for 
example rapidly experiencing anomaly when performing sentence-picture matching (e.g., H. 
H. Clark & Chase, 1972) or when hearing Every evening I drink some wine before I go to 
sleep uttered in a child’s voice (Van Berkum, van den Brink, Tesink, Kos, & Hagoort, 2008).  
In this example, the non-linguistic context may have been used integratively, but we 
proposed (section 2.3) that people can also use it predictively. For example (section 2.6 and 
Fig. 2), people could predict gunman instead of robber when they hear When news broke 
about the break-in, John arrived and arrested the … and at the same time see a man with a 
gun.  In fact, much research has investigated linguistic prediction in situations that combine 
linguistic and non-linguistic contexts, where the non-linguistic context provides “scaffolding” 
that may facilitate prediction and help the comprehender determine the derived intention.  
                                                 
15 Wright and Garrett (1984) arguably provided behavioral evidence for syntactic prediction. 
They presented participants with a sentence fragment word by word, and then had them make 
a lexical decision to a target word.  Decisions were faster when the context (e.g., The crowd 
near the church indicates that an important funeral) was syntactically congruent with the 
target word (translates) than when it was incongruent (translation), even though the target 
word was always semantically incongruent. Clearly, a verb continuation is syntactically 
predictable after this context, and so comprehenders may have predicted a verb phrase and 
then have processed a compatible upcoming word (translates) easily. Although the 
facilitatory effect occurred on the predictable word itself, there is some reason to believe that 
the effect is due to prediction (rather than integration). This is because there is extensive 
evidence that syntax is not processed strictly before semantics (e.g., Marslen-Wilson, 1973; 
Trueswell et al., 1994). Therefore, difficulty at the semantic integration stage should have led 
to just as much disruption for the syntactically congruent but semantically incongruent target 
word as for the syntactically and semantically incongruent target word. Instead, the fact that 
processing of syntactically congruent words was easier despite the fact they were 
semantically incongruent suggests facilitation at the syntactic level occurred very early (i.e., 
before any semantic processing took place), and this in turn suggests that readers had 
predicted a verb before processing translates. 
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Most relevant studies use the visual world paradigm and provide strong evidence for 
prediction-by-production. We have already reviewed many of these studies in Section 2 (e.g., 
Altmann & Kamide, 1999; Kamide et al., 2003; Chambers & San Juan, 2008), but did not 
include all the evidence in that section in the interest of readability. We instead review it in 
full here. The review is organized into two parts. The first part (3.3.1) demonstrates that 
many different aspects of the linguistic context constrain comprehenders’ prediction via 
covert imitation. The second part focuses on how comprehenders use non-linguistic context 
to derive the speaker’s underlying intention (3.3.2). 16 
Evidence from the visual-world paradigm supports covert imitation. (3.3.1)  
In section 2.3.1, we pointed out that in Kamide et al.’s (2003a) Japanese experiment, 
participants looked more at a likely theme (the hamburger) when they had heard customer in 
the dative (and thus typically a recipient) than when had heard it in the accusative, thus 
showing that their predictions were constrained by covert imitation of the context (see also 
Hintz et al., 2017; Arai et al., 2007 in Section 2.3.3).  Similarly, Kamide, Scheepers, and 
Altmann (2003b) found that participants looked at a cabbage after the German sentence the 
hare-NOM eat shortly … (“The hare will shortly eat …”) but at a fox after the hare-ACC eat 
shortly … (“… will shortly eat the hare”).  Participants’ predictions therefore depended on the 
thematic role (agent or patient) that they had ascribed to the hare, and indicate that they must 
have covertly imitated the context.  
In addition, Boland (2005) found that people predicted potential arguments more 
often than potential adjuncts – a finding that suggests that covert imitation of the linguistic 
context constrain which predictions are made.  Kaiser and Trueswell (2004) presented 
participants with a linguistic context that described one exemplar of a category, such as a 
sitting nurse.  In Finnish, an object-verb-subject order is used when the subject is discourse-
new.  When participants then heard the doctor-OBJ glances at the nurse-SUBJ (in contrast to 
the doctor-SUBJ glances at the nurse-OBJ) they preferentially looked at a different exemplar, 
in this case a standing nurse, before they could recognize the nurse.  Thus, a combination of 
information about discourse status and case marking can drive predictions, which is again 
compatible with predictions being constrained by covert imitation of the linguistic context.  
Moreover, Weber, Grice, and Crocker (2006) had participants listen to German 
sentences such as The cat-AMB chases possibly the bird-ACC/the dog-NOM (“The cat 
possibly chases the bird”/“The dog possibly chases the cat”), in which the cat is ambiguous 
until the last noun phrase makes its role clear. At the adverb, participants tended to launch 
predictive eye-movements towards the plausible object (bird) when the sentence had the 
appropriate intonation for subject-verb-object order. However, when the sentence had the 
appropriate intonation for object-verb-subject order, this preference disappeared. This study 
indicates that prosody is another aspect of the linguistic context used by comprehenders to 
constrain their predictions (see also Hirose & Mazuka, 2015, who found that listeners used 
stress on a noun to predict whether it is the first noun of a Japanese compound).   
Finally, comprehenders also take into account what is implied by the linguistic 
context (e.g., via scalar implicatures) to constrain their predictions. Kim, Gunlogson, 
Tanehaus, and Runner (2015) had participants hear discourses such as Neill has some apples 
and pears. Jeff only has some apples, and found that they looked at the apples or pears before 
hearing the final word to a greater extent than when only was removed.  Additionally, in 
                                                 
16 In theory, the visual world paradigm can also provide evidence about the time course of 
prediction.  If eye movements consistent with prediction of semantics occur before eye 
movements consistent with prediction of form, it would provide additional evidence for 
prediction-by-production.  
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Kurumada, Brown, Bibyk, Pontillo, and Tanenhaus (2014), participants heard sentences such 
as It looks like a zebra with the focus (emphasis) on zebra, which implies that it is a zebra, or 
on looks, which implies that it is not a zebra.  Before they heard zebra, they were more likely 
to fixate an unfamiliar animal that resembled a zebra when the focus was on looks than when 
it was on zebra. 
Visual-word studies show how comprehenders use non-linguistic context to 
compute the derived intention. (3.3.2) Visual-world studies are also informative about the 
role of non-linguistic context in constraining the derived intention (see Fig. 2, arrow from 
non-linguistic context to derived intention).  The non-linguistic context includes both the 
shared visual context and shared background knowledge. As an example of how the shared 
visual context may affect the derived intention, Knoeferle, Crocker, Scheepers, and Pickering 
(2005) presented participants with pictures of a princess washing a pirate and a fencer 
painting that princess.  After hearing The princess-AMB washes, they tended to look at the 
pirate; after hearing The princess-AMB paints, they tended to look at the fencer.  They 
therefore combined linguistic and visual information to interpret the princess as the agent of 
the washing-event or the patient of the painting-event, and used their interpretation to look at 
the other relevant entity before it was mentioned, presumably because they predicted its 
mention.  
Similarly, Knoeferle and Crocker (2006, 2007) had participants listen to object-verb-
subject sentences in German, such as The pilot-ACC spies-on soon the…, while looking at a 
scene containing the patient (pilot) and two other characters (a wizard and a detective). In the 
critical condition, one of the characters was a prototypical agent for the action described by 
the verb (detective), but the other character (wizard) was the actual agent (i.e., performed the 
action). Comprehenders looked at the actual agent shortly after they heard the verb (and 
before hearing wizard), rather than the prototypical agent (Knoeferle & Crocker, 2006; 
Experiment 2). (Instead, they looked at the prototypical agent when they listened to the same 
utterance while watching a display that did not contain the depicted agent). It is possible that 
comprehenders were incrementally interpreting the verb (spied-on) and simply looked at the 
picture that depicted the relevant event (spying), but we suggest that comprehenders assumed 
the speaker would refer to the visual context, and therefore used the visual context to assist in 
deriving the communicative intention.   
Further, Kaiser and Trueswell’s (2004) Finnish study suggests that people predict 
reference and not merely lexical information (as the nurse could refer to one of two 
exemplars).  Thus, people do not just predict the words that they are likely to hear but also 
what entities they believe speakers are likely to refer to (i.e., they predict the referent of the 
speaker’s communicative act; see Van Berkum, 2013).  Similarly, Altmann and Kamide 
(2007) showed that comprehenders do not merely predict words but also their likely reference 
(and also demonstrated that predictions can make use of verb tense):  Participants tended to 
look at an empty glass following The man has drunk… but at a full glass following The man 
will drink…  
Moreover, predictions appear to make use of a mental (situation) model, which forms 
part of the derived intention, and incorporates shared background knowledge about the world.  
For example, Altmann and Kamide (2009) showed that predictive eye movements can target 
locations that are consistent with such a mental representation, even if they do not correspond 
to the actual location of the object.  After hearing The woman will put the glass on the table.  
The woman will pick up the bottle and pour …, participants looked at the table rather than the 
actual location of the glass.  This did not happen when the first sentence was The woman was 
too lazy to put the glass on the table.   
 Similarly, Lowder and Ferreira (2016) had participants who heard The meat was 
pretty bland, so the chef reached for some salt uh I mean … were more likely to look at a 
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related alternative (pepper) than participants who heard The meat was pretty bland, so the 
chef reached for some salt and also …. Another group of listeners interpreted the disfluent 
utterance in much the same way as an utterance which included an explicit negation (…so the 
chef reached for not some salt but rather…).  Therefore, participants appeared to use the 
presence of a disfluency to infer the speaker’s intention and predict that she would now 
mention a different but related entity.  Thus, predictions can draw on shared knowledge about 
the process of speaking itself. 
The above findings do not demonstrate that the derived intention is linked to the 
speaker rather than the comprehender. In order to show that comprehenders maintain a 
representation of the speaker’s intention that is distinct from their own, and that they (at least 
sometimes) apply self-other adjustments to compensate for differences between themselves 
and the speaker (see dashed “Self-Other Adjustments” arrow to the derived intention in Fig. 
2), we turn to studies that manipulated whether the comprehender shared the same level of 
knowledge or ability with the speaker. Recall that Chambers and San Juan (2008) showed 
that listeners took into account their beliefs about what the speaker could or could not see 
when interpreting instructions to move objects around a grid (see section 1.3.2). In addition, 
Arnold, Hudson Kam, and Tanenhaus (2007) found that comprehenders looked at an 
unfamiliar object rather than a familiar object more after the disfluent Click on thee …uh … 
red than the fluent Click on the red …(see also Heller, Arnold, Klein, & Tanenhaus, 2015). 
However, the effect did not occur when they were told that the speaker had object agnosia 
(and hence had a plausible reason to be disfluent before a familiar object).  Thus, the effect 
cannot be due to an association between disfluencies and difficult-to-name objects.  
Similarly, Bosker, Quené, Sanders, and de Jong (2014) found that participants tended 
to look at an object with a low-frequency name after hearing a disfluency produced by a 
native speaker.  Importantly, participants did not tend to look at such an object when the 
disfluency was produced by a non-native speaker (as indicated by a clear foreign accent).  As 
in Chambers and San Juan (2008), these results imply that the comprehender can adjust for 
differences between herself and her beliefs about the speaker (i.e., having agnosia or being 
non-native), in accordance with prediction-by-production.  Together, these studies suggest 
that comprehenders derive the speaker’s intention and in doing so take into account 
characteristics of the speaker.    
In conclusion, the evidence about prediction involving non-linguistic contexts is 
particularly strong.  Comprehenders make extensive predictions based on different aspects of 
their knowledge of the language (e.g., grammar, meaning), predict reference and not merely 
words, and take into account their assumptions about speaker intention.  These findings 
therefore allow us to draw two main conclusions.  First, they indicate that the comprehender 
derives the intention by integrating linguistic processing (including using covert imitation) 
and non-linguistic context (see Fig. 2). Second, they support the prediction-by-production 
account in which the comprehender derives the speaker’s intention and then uses that 
intention to predict upcoming language. 
 
Speech (3.4) 
As mentioned in Section 1.1, many experiments show that a predictive context 
influences perception of ambiguous sounds (e.g., Ganong, 1980) or degraded speech (Miller, 
Heise, & Lichten, 1951; Samuel, 1981). In these studies, context sometimes refers to the 
lexical item a sound appears in, and sometimes to the larger (i.e., sentential or discourse) 
context. As other contextual facilitation effects (e.g., shorter reading times for words in high-
cloze sentences), these findings could be due to prediction of the target sound, but they could 
also be due to easier integration of the target sound.  
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In the speech-comprehension literature, the proposal that context effects are 
integrative is characteristic of feedforward or bottom-up accounts (e.g., Norris et al., 2000; 
McQueen, Cutler, & Norris, 2003; Norris, McQueen, & Cutler, 2003; McQueen, Norris, & 
Cutler, 2006; McQueen, Jesse, & Norris, 2009). These accounts propose that the activation of 
sound-based representations is initially based only on acoustic processing of the target sound, 
and is unaffected by context. Activation then flows from sound-based to lexical and semantic 
representations, and it is only at this later stage that activation of these higher-level 
representations can be influenced by context. In contrast, interactive accounts propose that 
context effects are due to prediction of sound-based representations (e.g., Elman & 
McClelland, 1988; McClelland, Mirman, & Holt, 2006). These accounts propose that lexical 
and semantic representations can potentially affect the earliest stages of acoustic processing.  
As testified by a long-lasting debate, distinguishing between these two types of 
account is extremely difficult.  Recent studies provide some evidence that comprehenders can 
indeed predict upcoming speech sounds, and that they do so using prediction-by-production, 
though these studies’ reliance on inference from activation of specific brain areas makes them 
dependent on assumptions about the localization of specific aspects of comprehension.  
Below, we review these findings, first in relation to ambiguous speech and speech in noise 
(3.4.1), and then in relation to cases when individual speech sounds are replaced by noise or 
silence (3.4.2). Finally, we consider the evidence for prediction of sounds due to 
coarticulation (3.4.3) and for motor activation during speech comprehension (3.4.4). To 
foreshadow, we argue that the evidence from speech in noise, and to a lesser extent from 
speech sounds replaced by noise or silence and from coarticulation, indicates that sounds are 
predicted during speech; there is also some evidence that such predictions involve production 
mechanisms, particularly from studies that show motor activation. Of course, most of the 
evidence we review uses ambiguous, noisy, or otherwise manipulated speech, and it is an 
open question to what extent this evidence is representative of comprehension under less 
adverse conditions.  
Ambiguous speech and speech in noise. (3.4.1) When comprehenders hear a sound 
that is acoustically “mid-way” between two phonemes, they tend to categorize it in line with 
the context. For example, recall that the same ambiguous fricative is categorized more often 
as /s/ after tremendou-, but as /ʃ/ after repleni- (Ganong, 1980; Samuel, 2001). Similarly, the 
same ambiguous velar stop at the beginning of -oat is categorized more often as /g/ when it 
follows a context that makes goat highly predictable (e.g., The busy dairyman hurried to milk 
the…), and more often as /k/ when the context makes coat highly predictable (e.g., The 
careful laundress had to dry-clean the…; Borsky, Tuller, & Shapiro, 1998). In addition, 
words in noise are more likely to be accurately identified if they are more predictable than if 
they are less predictable (e.g., Bradlow & Alexander, 2007; see Mattys, Davis, Bradlow, & 
Scott, 2012).  But as we argued above, these contextual effects could reflect integration rather 
than prediction.  
Elman and McClelland (1988) reported a finding that is potentially informative about 
prediction. When they hear a sound that is ambiguous between /t/ and /k/, comprehenders 
tend to report /k/ more often following /s/ than following /ʃ/ (probably as a result of 
compensation for co-articulation; Mann & Repp, 1981). Interestingly, Elman and McClelland 
showed that comprehenders’ categorization of the ambiguous sound is similarly influenced 
by a context sound that is itself ambiguous (mid-way between /s/ and /ʃ/) as long as it is 
embedded in a biasing lexical context (e.g., progre-). They argued that the lexical node 
progress was activated by the fragment progre-; activation then flowed from progress to its 
component phonemes, including /s/ but not /ʃ/. The predicted /s/ phoneme, in turn, biased 
perception of the ambiguous /t/-/k/ sound. However, it is unclear whether these findings 
actually demonstrate prediction of /s/: The ambiguous /t/-/k/ sound may activate both /s/ and 
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/ʃ/, and later /s/ is selected because it integrates more easily with the context. Therefore, 
Elman and McClelland’s study does not demonstrate prediction. To demonstrate prediction of 
sound using ambiguous stimuli, it would be necessary to show that processing at the lexical 
level temporally precedes and causally affects processing at the phonological level. 17 
In an fMRI study, Guediche, Salvata, and Blumstein (2013) had participants hear 
words with unambiguous or ambiguous initial consonants (e.g., consistent with coat/goat, as 
in Borsky et al., 1998), following sentence contexts either where coat and goat were equally 
predictable or where only one of them was predictable. There was an interaction between 
predictability and perceptual ambiguity in the superior temporal gyrus (STG), which is 
associated with acoustic processing, and in the middle temporal gyrus (MTG), which is 
associated with lexico-semantic processing (e.g., Friederici, 2012). The predictability effect 
in an acoustic area is compatible with prediction (see Obleser & Kotz, 2010, for a related 
finding using degraded sentences), but does not demonstrate prediction because this study did 
not indicate whether activation in MTG preceded activation in STG (which would support 
prediction) or vice versa. Moreover, when Davis, Ford, Kherif, and Johnsrude (2011) used 
time-resolved fMRI (an analysis technique that provides temporal as well as spatial 
information) to compare clear and degraded (i.e., with added signal-correlated noise) versions 
of both coherent (e.g., The child left all of his lunch at home) and anomalous sentences (e.g., 
The thing felt all of his speech at line), they found no evidence for prediction. Although an 
interaction between degradation and sentence coherence was present in both STG and the left 
inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG, which is associated with lexical processing; Friederici, 2012; 
Indefrey & Levelt, 2004), it emerged earlier in the former than the latter (i.e., contrary to the 
timecourse that would support prediction).  
In contrast, Sohoglu, Peelle, Carlyon, and Davis (2012) found earlier activation in 
LIFG than in STG using combined EEG and MEG recording. They used noise-vocoded 
words (i.e., synthesized by using the speech amplitude envelope to modulate noise, across 
different frequency bands). Spoken words were preceded by a written stimulus that was 
neutral (i.e., a row of Xs), or a word matching or mismatching the upcoming spoken stimulus. 
In the matching condition (compared to the neutral and mismatching conditions), brain 
activity in LIFG increased before activity in STG decreased. Moreover, the LIFG effect 
occurred as early as 90-130ms after the onset of the spoken stimulus. These findings provide 
strong evidence for prediction-by-production.  Specifically, they suggest that predicted 
lexical representations led to prediction of phonological representations.  
Gow and Olson (2015) used a design similar to Guediche et al. (2013) while 
recording combined MEG and EEG. They applied Granger causation analysis to identify the 
patterns of activity in other brain areas that could (statistically) explain activity observed over 
time in posterior STG (pSTG) during the comprehension of the ambiguous stimulus words 
(100-500ms post-stimulus). They found that several areas implicated in lexical and semantic 
processing (including part of the LIFG and left anterior MTG) could explain activity related 
to acoustic processing in pSTG, suggesting that semantic and lexical representations directly 
                                                 
17 Even if it could be demonstrated that Elman and McClelland’s (1988) findings are 
due to prediction, it is not clear whether it would be prediction-by-production (i.e., with 
activation spreading from lexical nodes to phonemes), or rather due to activation spreading 
within the phonological level from one phoneme to another. The latter could reflect listeners’ 
knowledge of associations (i.e., transitional probabilities) between sounds (see Pitt & 
McQueen, 1998; Samuel & Pitt, 2003; Magnuson, McMurray, Tanenhaus, & Aslin, 2003; 
McQueen et al., 2006 for discussion), and would thus constitute a form of prediction-by-
association. 
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influence acoustic processing. Interestingly, the posterior MTG (pMTG), an area which maps 
from lexico-syntactic and semantic representations to word forms, influenced pSTG via the 
supramarginal gyrus (SMG). These findings suggest a flow of activation from higher-order to 
sound-based areas, which is again consistent with prediction-by-production.  However, 
McQueen, Eisner, and Norris (2016) noted that there is substantial disagreement over the role 
of SMG in speech comprehension: This area may mediate articulatory-based and sound-
based representations sublexically, rather than via a shared lexical entry, and so it is difficult 
to interpret the flow of activation in Gow and Olson’s study. 
Finally, Gagnepain, Henson, and Davis (2012) provided evidence for the prediction of 
specific sounds. Participants learned novel words (e.g., formubo) that were very similar to 
existing ones (i.e., formula). They were then tested on the following day, to allow the newly 
learned items to consolidate overnight. The purpose was to create a new uniqueness point 
(after /ˈfɔːmjʊ-/ for formula) by introducing a competitor in the participants’ mental lexicon. 
Participants were also tested on novel words they had not learned and words they had learned 
but not consolidated (which presumably would not compete with existing words). Crucially, 
consolidated words elicited less activity in STG before the new uniqueness point, and they 
elicited more activity in STG after the new uniqueness point. This pattern is consistent with 
prediction. Before the new uniqueness point (at /ˈfɔːm-/), listeners activated two lexical 
entries (formula and formubo) that both pre-activated the upcoming diphthong /jʊ/ and 
therefore predicted these sounds more strongly, thus facilitating their processing in STG. In 
contrast, after the new uniqueness point (i.e., after /ˈfɔːmjʊ-/), listeners were more likely to 
predict the wrong sounds, and the resulting mismatch between predictions and sensory input 
led to increased activity in STG.  In sum, findings from Gagnepain et al. and Sohoglu et al. 
(2012) strongly suggest that listeners predict upcoming speech sounds based on activated 
lexical representations, which is consistent with prediction-by-production.  
Speech replaced by noise or silence. (3.4.2) When a single speech sound is replaced 
by white noise or a cough, listeners often fail to notice the sound is missing if the spectral 
characteristics of the replacement are sufficiently similar to those of the replaced sound (e.g., 
if the replaced sound is a fricative). This is known as the phoneme restoration effect (R. M. 
Warren, 1970). Although the fact that restoration is more likely for predictable than 
unpredictable words (Samuel, 1981, Experiment 3) could suggest that listeners predict the 
missing sound, the behavioral evidence for phoneme restoration is also consistent with an 
ease-of-integration explanation (although cf. Repp, 1992), because it relies on offline 
categorization responses made after listeners have heard the end of the word.   
But in an fMRI study, Shahin, Bishop, and Miller (2009) found more activation in 
areas related to language production (LIFG, left pre-supplementary motor area [pre-SMA], 
and bilateral insula) during successful restoration than when listening to an intact stimulus 
(with the LIFG and insula showing more activation for words than pseudo-words). Leonard, 
Baud, Sjerps, and Chang (2016) used electrocorticography (ECoG) to compare brain activity 
(in STG) during perception of replaced and intact stimuli at electrodes that are known to 
discriminate between specific pairs of sounds (e.g., between /k/ in /fæktr/ (factor) and /s/ in 
/fæstr/ (faster)). They found that activation elicited within 150ms of the onset of the replaced 
sound (i.e., noise, represented by # in /fæ#tr/) closely matched the activation elicited by 
actually hearing the reported sound (as in the intact stimuli). Crucially, they also found that 
activation in a separate area (left frontal cortex) peaking 130ms before the onset of noise 
could be used to categorize what sound the participant would later report having perceived. 
These effects were similar whether the participants heard the words embedded in sentential 
contexts or in isolation and suggest that participants predicted the missing sound on the basis 
of having predicted a particular lexical item (either as a likely completion to a sentential 
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context or because they had recently heard the intact version of that lexical item).18 Thus, 
neuroscientific evidence on phoneme restoration of sounds replaced by noise supports the 
conclusion that prediction-by-production is implicated in the filling-in of sounds replaced by 
noise.   
We now discuss ERP studies that investigated how words with missing phonemes are 
processed in real time. Sivonen and colleagues (Sivonen, Maess, Lattner, & Friederici, 2006; 
Sivonen, Maess, & Friederici, 2006) had participants listen to high-Cloze (80%) and low-
Cloze (0%) sentences where the initial phoneme of the final word was either present or 
replaced by a cough or a silent gap. The N400 effect for manipulated words occurred later, 
but was no larger than for intact words (see also Groppe et al., 2010 for a replication of this 
finding using tones). This finding suggests that lexical access could proceed on the basis of 
partial acoustic information. In addition, manipulated words in high-Cloze sentences 
generated an N400-like effect compared to intact words, but only when the replaced sound 
was short (i.e., a plosive). According to the authors, such short gaps or coughs did not afford 
sufficient time for listeners to generate predictions about the target word, therefore causing 
additional difficulty with lexical retrieval. Such an interpretation is compatible with 
prediction of words, but does not demonstrate that the component sounds of the predicted 
word can be predicted as well.  
Mattys, Pleydell-Pearce, Melhorn, and Whitecross (2005) investigated the brain’s 
response when participants detected silent gaps while listening to highly predictable and 
weakly predictable words with an early or late uniqueness point. The amplitude of the N1 (a 
negative deflection peaking soon after 100ms and reflecting early auditory processing) 
elicited by the gap was largest for highly predictable words with late uniqueness points. One 
interpretation of this finding is that such words afford strong predictions for upcoming sounds 
(see Gagnepain et al., 2012). When the listeners encounter the silence, these predictions are 
disconfirmed, resulting in a larger N1. However, it is also possible that detecting gaps is 
easier when the word is easier to process because it is more predictable – an explanation that 
is compatible with an integration account (Mattys et al., 2005). More compellingly, 
Bendixen, Scharinger, Strauss, and Obleser (2014) showed larger Mismatch Negativity 
(MMN) responses to an omitted word-final sound when the word was highly predictable. The 
MMN is elicited without conscious attention, so it is unlikely that this finding can be 
explained by the fact that it is easier to detect gaps in more predictable words. Importantly, 
though, these findings do not show comprehenders predicted specific sounds but rather that 
they predicted the occurrence of sound (vs. silence).  The latter possibility is of course 
consistent with other evidence that comprehenders are extremely sensitive to the timing of 
speech, for example that they show a smaller N400 in response to semantically anomalous 
words that occur in a regular than an irregular metrical context (Rothermich, Schmidt-
Kassow, & Kotz, 2012). 
Prediction due to coarticulation. (3.4.3) Listeners use co-articulatory information to 
quickly direct their attention to visual referents. In a visual-world study, Dahan, Magnuson, 
Tanenhaus, and Hogan (2001) had participants listen to instructions such as Click on the net, 
and found that they took longer to fixate the corresponding object when the initial syllable of 
the target word (net) had been cross-spliced from a different word (e.g., neck), thus showing 
that misleading co-articulatory cues slow down speech comprehension. More importantly, 
Salverda, Kleinschmidt, and Tanenhaus (2014) showed that listeners begin directing their 
attention towards the referent of a consonant-initial noun as soon as they hear co-articulatory 
                                                 
18 Note that in this study the same replaced stimulus was heard as either intact word (e.g., as 
either factor or faster) at least 25% of the time, and so the effect cannot be due to residual 
acoustic information about the replaced sound carried by the surrounding sounds. 
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cues in the final vowel of the preceding word the (see Mahr, McMillan, Saffran, Weismer, & 
Edwards, 2015 for a similar study with toddlers). Gow and McMurray (2007) showed that 
listeners hearing green boat are quicker to look at a boat (rather than another green object) 
when the final nasal in the adjective is (appropriately) assimilated to a labial place of 
articulation than when it is not; this effect occurs very rapidly, starting from 140ms after the 
onset of boat. Finally, when observing a signed utterance that ended in a semantically 
unpredictable sign, users of German sign language showed an enhanced N400 effect whose 
onset began before the onset of the sign itself, during the transition from the previous sign 
(Hosemann, Herrmann, Steinbach, Bornkessel-Schlesewsky, & Schlesewsky, 2013); the 
transition is similar to the later portion of a vowel immediately preceding a consonant in the 
sense that, like the vowel, it carries information about the nature of the upcoming sign. 
In sum, comprehenders make immediate use of co-articulation information. Does this 
mean that they predict upcoming speech sounds? Listeners who hear a nasal consonant with 
labial features may not predict a labial consonant. Rather, when they later encounter /b/, they 
may recognize this phoneme and integrate it with the context more easily when it follows a 
nasal with labial features, and this may in turn speed up looks towards the correct visual 
referent. But it is also possible that listeners use their knowledge about place assimilation to 
predict a labial consonant (or activation may spread from labial features to all labial 
phonemes). They then look towards the visual referent whose name begins with a labial 
consonant, before the labial consonant itself occurs. This would be of course be consistent 
with ERP and MEG evidence for the activation of form (e.g., Dikker et al., 2010; Kim & Lai, 
2012). Thus, findings that show rapid use of co-articulation information to guide speech 
comprehension do not demonstrate prediction, but they do provide some support for it. 
Motor activation during speech comprehension. (3.4.4) We have noted (section 
2.2) that the language production system appears to be activated during comprehension (e.g., 
Fadiga et al., 2002; Pulvermüller et al., 2006), and particularly under adverse conditions (e.g., 
Adank, 2012).  There is some evidence that such activation is predictive.  D'Ausilio, 
Jarmolowska, Busan, Bufalari, and Craighero (2011) repeatedly exposed participants to a 
pseudoword (birro or biffo) while recording MEPs from their tongue. On most trials, they 
heard a prime pseudoword (e.g., birro) and 1s later the same pseudoword, either pronounced 
appropriately (i.e., the same as the prime) or inappropriately (with bi containing 
coarticulation cues appropriate for biffo).  Specifically, they heard bi, then after 100ms 
received TMS to the tongue, and after 300-350ms heard the double consonant (e.g., rro).  
Upon TMS stimulation, they found immediate (within 8-11ms) activation of tongue muscles 
(associated with the articulation of rr) when they heard the appropriately but not 
inappropriately pronounced target.  Thus, the appropriate articulators are active within just 
over 100ms of the offset of bi.  This result could be due to predictive activation of birro (i.e., 
because the participant predicted that the prime will be repeated), which in turn led to 
prediction of the upcoming double-consonant while listening to bi, specifically via pre-
activation of the articulators; though it is possible that perception of bi (when co-articulated 
with rro) activated the tongue muscles bottom-up.  
D’Ausilio et al.’s (2011) findings provide some evidence for prediction of upcoming 
sounds and specifically for prediction-by-production. Interestingly, these effects are 
consistent with the facilitatory role of visual speech (i.e., observing the speaker’s articulatory 
movements) on speech comprehension; visual speech might specifically support predictions 
of upcoming sounds, because articulatory movements sometimes precede the corresponding 
sounds by more than 100ms (see Skipper, Nusbaum, & Small, 2006; p. 252).   
 
 
 
 47 
Predicting in Dialogue (3.5) 
 In dialogue, interlocutors may predict the content of what their partners are going to 
say, something which also takes place in passive comprehension (i.e., monologue).  But they 
may also predict when their partner is likely to finish speaking, something which may help 
them to respond in a timely manner. We consider these two types of prediction and discuss 
how they may be related. 
 Predicting content in dialogue may be similar to predicting content in monologue.  At 
present, we have no reason to believe that the mechanisms are different (e.g., Figs 1 and 2 
should still hold).  But dialogue is unlike most monologue, for example having many brief, 
fragmentary contributions rather than complete sentences, and so addressees may tend to 
predict different units from comprehenders in monologue.  It also tends to be more repetitive 
than monologue (see Pickering & Garrod, 2004) and hence more predictable, and so 
addressees may particularly rely on prediction (cf. Brothers, Swaab, & Traxler, 2017).  Note 
that the speaker might also predict the addressee’s response as well as the addressee 
predicting the rest of the speaker’s utterance (though we know of no studies on this issue).   
Moreover, the addressee may have her production system “ready,” because she may 
contribute during the speaker’s utterance (providing “backchannel feedback”) or later (e.g., 
with a response).  This might facilitate prediction-by-production – a claim that is compatible 
with the evidence that activating the production system facilitates the processing of 
predictable utterances: Hintz, Meyer, and Huettig (2016) found sentences with predictable 
words were read faster than sentences with unpredictable words, but only when participants 
also named pictures following sentence contexts on other trials during the experiment.  These 
effects may be due to prediction or integration, but they suggest that people use production 
mechanisms in comprehending predictable sentences, and those mechanisms can be primed 
when comprehenders use them in production. However, there are no direct comparisons of 
prediction in monologue and dialogue.  
A few studies have investigated neural coupling (how activation in listeners’ brains 
correlates with activation in the speaker’s brain) using fMRI. Stephens, Silbert, and Hasson 
(2010) found that listeners whose brain activity precedes correlated activity in the speaker 
(i.e., exhibit stronger predictive coupling) also comprehend better. Dikker, Silbert, Hasson, 
and Zevin (2014) found increased coupling (in posterior STG) for more versus less 
predictable picture descriptions but there was no evidence that this effect was due to 
predictions by the listener.  To our knowledge, no study has specifically investigated whether 
increased coupling in areas related to language production is related to enhanced prediction 
of the speaker’s utterance. 
 In contrast, there is substantial research about when addressees predict their partners 
will finish speaking.  Observational researchers assume that interlocutors regularly predict 
each other’s turn-endings (e.g., Sacks et al., 1974), largely because most turn-transitions are 
very short. Stivers et al. (2009) found that turn-transitions across ten languages had a mean 
ranging between 0ms and 500ms and a mode ranging between 0ms and 200ms (see also De 
Ruiter, Mitterer, & Enfield, 2006, who reported 45% of transitions between −250ms and 
+250ms, for a corpus of Dutch telephone conversations).  It takes at least 600ms to produce a 
single word (e.g., Indefrey & Levelt, 2004) and longer for a multi-word utterance (e.g., M. 
Smith & Wheeldon, 1999), so addressees cannot regularly wait till the speaker has finished 
before preparing their turn.  This is even the case for prepared utterances, which take over 
500ms (Ferreira, 1991).   
 An appealing explanation for short turn-transitions is that the addressee predicts when 
the speaker is likely to end and prepares a response in advance (e.g., Levinson, 2016).  
However, it is possible that listeners react to early cues present in the speaker’s turn (e.g., 
aspects of prosody or speaker gaze) rather than predicting turn ends (Duncan, 1972; Heldner 
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& Edlund, 2010).  Alternatively, they could respond on the basis of a point at which the 
utterance might have ended but did not (a so-called transition relevant place), for example in 
tag questions (e.g., What do you want to do, Alex?).  
Clearer evidence for turn-end prediction comes from Magyari, Bastiaansen, De 
Ruiter, and Levinson (2014), who had participants listen to turns extracted from the corpus of 
Dutch telephone conversations used by De Ruiter et al. (2006). To assess the predictability of 
turns, they were cut at several points, and a norming group of participants provided 
completions.  They were more likely to correctly complete some turns (predictable) than 
others (unpredictable), starting from 600ms before the actual end of the turn. Experimental 
participants were instructed to press a button exactly at turn end, and were encouraged to 
predict when this moment would occur. These listeners responded very close to turn end and, 
importantly, earlier when listening to predictable (-70ms) than unpredictable (+140ms) turns. 
Moreover, listeners' EEG recordings showed an earlier (starting at least 1250ms before turn 
end) power decrease in the beta frequency range for predictable than unpredictable turns, and 
this effect was localized to brain areas involved in directing attention to a moment in time and 
in syntactic and lexical processing.  These findings thus suggest a role for lexical and 
syntactic information in the prediction of turn endings.  
  In De Ruiter et al. (2006), participants judged turn endings for unedited 
conversational turns and for turns without prosodic information (i.e., with flattened pitch) or 
without lexical information (i.e., low-pass filtered).  The lexically edited turns led to earlier 
(and hence more inaccurate) responses, but the prosodically edited turns did not, suggesting 
that people predict turn-endings based on the content of what they hear.  Magyari and De 
Ruiter (2012) had another group of participants provide completions to fragments of these 
turns (cut off at various points).  They found that De Ruiter et al.’s participants made better 
turn-end judgments both for turns that the new participants were more likely to complete with 
the turn’s actual ending (i.e., the same words) and for turns that the new participants were 
more likely to complete with the same number of words as the turn’s actual ending.  These 
findings suggest that people predict the content and length of endings. 
 Other studies suggest that prosody may also be implicated in turn-end predictions. 
Bögels and Torreira (2015) showed that listeners judged the end of questions such as So, are 
you a student? to be later when the question had been extracted from a longer question (So, 
are you a student at Radboud University?) than when it had not. As the words are the same, 
they concluded that participants must use prosodic cues to predict turn-endings. These cues 
may be particularly important when turns contain a transition-relevant place (just after 
student in this case), so that only prosody can inform listeners whether the speaker has 
finished speaking or will continue. Similarly, Lammertink, Casillas, Benders, Post, and 
Fikkert (2015) showed that adult (and child) listeners were most likely to switch their gaze 
from the current to the next speaker when both the prosody and the syntax suggested that the 
turn was complete, presumably as a result of prediction. However, there was a stronger effect 
when only syntax was complete than when only prosody was complete.   
Overall, it is clear that people can predict when utterances will end using aspects of 
those utterances’ linguistic content, including syntax and prosody. We cannot be certain 
whether such turn-end predictions rely mainly on prediction-by-production or on prediction-
by-association. However, using prediction-by-production may have additional benefits for 
addressees, as it could help them prepare a response: If the speaker asks What type of water 
would you like, still or sparkling?, an addressee who predicts sparkling using production 
mechanisms would be able to produce a response more quickly, and might find it especially 
easy to produce the word sparkling.  
As discussed above, listeners can use content predictions to drive predictions about 
the timing of turn-endings. But how can content predictions be transformed into timing 
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predictions? Listeners might extract coarse timing estimates (e.g., number of words) or finer 
timing estimates (e.g., number of syllables or phonemes) from their predictions of content. 
However, the duration of words and syllables varies greatly with speech rate. Therefore, it 
may be that the listener tracks the speech rate of the current speaker (Garrod & Pickering, 
2015; Wilson & Wilson, 2005), and thereby predicts upcoming timing (e.g., Dilley & Pitt, 
2010).  In fact, MEG evidence suggests that oscillatory entrainment to the speech signal in 
left auditory cortex is driven by oscillations in areas that include pre-motor cortex, suggesting 
that speech-rate tracking may be production-based (Park, Ince, Schyns, Thut, & Gross, 2015). 
 In conclusion, prediction may be particularly important as a means of facilitating 
smooth interactions (e.g., Scott, McGettigan, & Eisner, 2009) – it is hard to see how dialogue 
could function without prediction.  Dialogue highlights the benefit of predicting the timing of 
utterances as well as their content.  It may lead to enhanced activation of the production 
system (compared with monologue) so that addressees can be ready to respond when 
appropriate.  As we have argued that prediction-by-production is central to most prediction 
during language comprehension, we propose that it should be enhanced during dialogue, and 
that forms of dialogue that require extensive response preparation (e.g., involving 
interrogatives) may further enhance prediction. Studies directly comparing monologue and 
dialogue would be valuable in testing these proposals. 
 
Prediction in Different Populations (3.6) 
 Most studies consider prediction in young adult native speakers. In this section, we 
review studies that have instead considered prediction (using various methods) in different 
populations, specifically older adults and children.  This literature is not extensive, but 
provides some evidence about the extent to which prediction is affected by knowledge and 
resources.  In addition, we have already discussed the literature for non-native speakers in 
section 2.4.3, where we suggested that non-native speakers’ predictions may be similar to 
native speakers’ predictions at the semantic level but non-native speakers may be less likely 
to predict syntax than native speakers (Foucart et al., 2014, 2016; Mitsugi & MacWhinney, 
2016) and even less likely to predict form (Ito et al., 2016; Martin et al., 2013).  These 
findings support the optionality of prediction and also support prediction-by-production, with 
later stages being less likely to occur in non-native speakers as a consequence of their poorer 
proficiency.  In that section, we also discussed the effects of reading skills on prediction, 
where we suggested that prediction may be more likely for skilled adult readers than readers 
with low literacy (Mishra et al., 2012) or dyslexia (Huettig & Brouwer, 2015).  Note that 
there has been some interest in prediction during aphasic comprehension (e.g., Mack, Ji, & 
Thompson, 2013; T. Warren, Dickey, & Lei, 2016), but the limited evidence and the 
underlying differences across aphasics make any conclusions premature. Below we consider 
older adults (2.6.1) and children (2.6.2). 
Older adults. (3.6.1) Some ERP evidence suggests that older adults predict less than 
younger adults.  Federmeier et al. (2002) conducted a version of Federmeier and Kutas 
(1999) using auditory presentation, and found similar results for younger adults, but a smaller 
reduction for words related to the predictable word (e.g., pines for palms) in older adults, and 
(unlike Federmeier & Kutas, 1999) this effect occurred only when the context was weakly 
(rather than strongly) predictive.  Interestingly, these age-related differences were driven by 
older adults with lower verbal fluency and vocabulary size, which is consistent with the 
resource-intensive nature of prediction-by-production (see also Federmeier et al., 2010, but 
cf. Wlotko et al., 2012).  Finally, we noted in section 2.4.3 that DeLong et al. (2012) could 
not replicate DeLong et al. (2005)’s evidence for prediction of form with older adults (but see 
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footnote 5).  In summary, older adults appear to predict less than younger adults, both at the 
semantic and at the form level.19 
Children. (3.6.2) More studies have investigated children’s ability to predict, in part 
because of a theoretical proposal that prediction may underlie language learning (see F. 
Chang et al., 2006; Rabagliati, Gambi, & Pickering, 2015). Using a similar method to 
Altmann and Kamide (1999), Nation, Marshall, and Altmann (2003) found that 10-11 year 
olds looked at the target object (e.g., a cake) in a predictive context (Jane watched her mother 
eat a cake) well before the onset of the target noun (cake).  In contrast to studies with adults 
(Huettig & Brouwer, 2015; Mishra et al., 2012), they found no relationship between reading 
skill and prediction.  However, Mani and Huettig (2014) did find that 8 year olds who read 
words better predicted more. 
As noted in section 2.3.1, Borovsky et al. (2012) had 3-10 year old children (and 
adults) listen to sentences such as The pirate will chase the ship while viewing pictures of a 
ship, treasure, a cat, and a bone.  Similarly to Kamide et al. (2003), they found that listeners 
looked most at the predictable entity (a ship) and also more at entities related to the subject 
(treasure) or verb (a cat), in comparison to an unrelated entity (a bone).  They also found a 
correlation between children’s comprehension vocabulary and extent of prediction (see also 
Borovsky & Creel, 2014). Borovsky, Sweeney, Elman, and Fernald (2014) extended 
Borovsky et al.’s (2012) findings to novel events (e.g., The monkey rides the bus) that 
participants learned about from story books before they took part in the visual-world task. 
Interestingly, 3-to-4-year olds did not look at the most predictable entity (a bus) more than at 
an entity related to the verb (a car), whereas older children and adults did.  This suggests that 
younger children may find it difficult to combine information from the subject and the verb to 
constrain their predictions when the event being described is novel (rather than already 
known), and hence that their predictions are affected by either knowledge or resource 
limitations. 
Using two-object displays, Mani and Huettig (2012) showed prediction in two-year-
olds, with their production vocabulary (rather than their comprehension vocabulary) 
correlating with the extent of prediction. Mani, Daum, and Huettig (2016) showed two-year-
olds predict an object more when it is more strongly associated with the verb: For example, 
on hearing read toddlers looked more at a book (strongly associated) rather than a letter 
(weakly associated). Finally, Bobb, Huettig, and Mani (2016) showed that 30-month-olds 
predict shape-related information (similarly to adults, as shown by Rommers et al., 2015). 
Overall, thus, there is good evidence that children predict meaning from a very young age.  
                                                 
19 Further ERP work has compared younger to older adults’ comprehension abilities, but it is 
unclear whether the differences it uncovered are specifically related to prediction. Federmeier 
et al. (2007) had young participants read more (85% Cloze) or less (27% Cloze) predictive 
contexts followed by predictable or unpredictable (but plausible) target words; they found an 
N400 effect after both types of contexts, which was greater following the more predictive 
contexts. Wlotko, Federmeier, and Kutas (2012) found the same pattern with older adults (72 
year olds), but the N400 effect was reduced (and somewhat delayed), and in fact there was no 
significant difference between predictable and unpredictable words following less predictive 
contexts.  These effects could be due to integration, but they are compatible with the idea that 
older adults take advantage of contextual predictability less than young adults (cf. Wlotko & 
Federmeier, 2012a; Federmeier et al., 2010). In addition, Wlotko et al. (2012) found that the 
older adults did not show a late pre-frontal positivity in response to unpredictable words in 
high-Cloze contexts.  This effect did occur for younger adults in Federmeier et al. (2007) and 
has been interpreted as evidence of effects of a disconfirmed prediction (see Section 4.4).   
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Similarly, it is clear that young children predict syntax.  Using a method similar to 
Arai et al. (2007), Thothatiri and Snedeker (2008) found that 3- and 4-year-olds predict that 
upcoming referents will be mentioned in the order implied by the syntactic structure (PO or 
DO) they have just comprehended (i.e., therefore showing effects of both syntactic priming 
and syntactic prediction).  In addition, Lukyanenko and Fisher (2016) showed that 3- and, to 
a lesser extent, 2.5-year-olds predictively look at a picture of multiple objects when they hear 
Where are the ... They argued that the children used the syntactic number of the verb to 
predict the number of an upcoming subject noun; thus, they use a syntactic relation (i.e., 
syntactic agreement) to guide their predictions (see also Melançon & Shi, 2015).  Finally, 
Gambi, Pickering, and Rabagliati (2016) used a method similar to Kukona et al. (2011) to 
show that 3-to-5-year olds predict entities that are both semantically associated and 
syntactically predictable, but not merely semantically associated (e.g., looking at a robber but 
not a policeman after Pingu will arrest the…).  These findings are consistent with prediction-
by-production but not prediction-by-association. 
There is little evidence about whether young children predict form.  Mahr et al. (2015) 
showed that 2-year-olds look more quickly to a referent when its name is preceded by a 
determiner carrying informative coarticulation cues. These results are similar to those of 
Salverda et al. (2014) for adults (see section 2.4.3) and, like those findings, do not 
demonstrate that they use the determiner to predict the noun. Children’s looks to the referent 
are overall much slower than adults’ and so an integration explanation is especially likely for 
them.   
 Evidence from prediction in different population supports the optionality of 
prediction. (3.6.3) Overall, predictive abilities develop early and can be present in non-native 
speakers and older adults.  However, prediction appears to be less pronounced in such 
populations than in native-speaking young adults – people who are fast and skilled language 
users with extensive processing resources – and in fact may not always occur.  Given that 
such groups can comprehend language, these findings suggest that prediction is an aid to 
comprehension rather than a necessary component of it.  
 We have proposed (sections 2.4-2.6) that optionality characterizes prediction-by-
production in particular, but not prediction-by-association, because the latter is an integral 
component of every act of comprehension and is largely resource-free. This proposal means 
that prediction-by-association, unlike prediction-by-production, should be unimpaired in 
comprehenders with limited resources, but we know of no study that has tested this directly. 
It also means that predictions that correspond to later stages of production (and particularly 
predictions of form based on predictions of semantics, such as in De Long et al., 2005) 
should be more impaired in comprehenders with limited resources, because such predictions 
should require more time-consuming and resource-intensive computations. At present, the 
evidence from non-native speakers supports this claim (e.g., Martin et al., 2013), but there is 
insufficient evidence from other populations to be able to generalize this conclusion. 
 
Discussion (4.) 
 As we have shown, there is overwhelming evidence that prediction is widespread in 
language comprehension.  Studies using electrophysiology, eye movements, and reaction 
times demonstrate that it occurs when utterances are encountered in isolation or in non-
linguistic contexts, in monologue and dialogue, and in reading and listening.  It also occurs at 
different linguistic levels, from semantics to syntax to form.  The conclusion that prediction is 
widespread holds even if we only consider findings for which an integration explanation is 
not possible (as we have done in Section 2), but is further reinforced by the systematic review 
we conducted in Section 3. 
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Our review provides strong and converging evidence that the most effective means of 
prediction during comprehension utilizes the system that is used to produce utterances, a 
system that is both sophisticated and already available to the comprehender.  As illustrated in 
Figure 2, the comprehender derives the intention that would be used to drive production, 
using a combination of covert imitation (of what the speaker has said so far) and the non-
linguistic context.  They use the intention to start the process of production, and the output of 
the production process constitutes the predictions that they make.  This process takes place as 
the comprehender encounters every new word in the utterance (see Fig. 1). 
The two strongest forms of evidence for prediction-by-production come from 
electrophysiology and from the visual-world paradigm, and they are largely complementary 
to each other.  Electrophysiological studies demonstrate that comprehenders predict levels of 
representation that are computed later in production on the basis of levels of representation 
that are computed earlier (e.g., grammatical gender from semantics; Wicha et al., 2004), and 
that such predictions require the involvement of the production system (Martin et al., 2018). 
Visual-world studies demonstrate that comprehenders use covert imitation (e.g., Kamide et 
al., 2003) and derive the speaker’s intention (Chambers & San Juan, 2008).  In addition, 
studies of speech provide evidence for motor activation during prediction (e.g., Drake & 
Corley, 2015) and the evidence for turn-end prediction (e.g., Magyari et al., 2014) and early 
preparation of responses (Bögels et al., 2015) in dialogue strongly suggests that prediction-
by-production benefits the smooth and rapid exchange of turns we observe in conversation. 
 
The When and How of Prediction-by-Production (4.1) 
Prediction-by-production is widespread but optional. In Figure 2, we distinguished 
obligatory processes (comprehension and covert imitation) that lead to deriving the speaker’s 
intention from optional processes that generate predictions by running the intention through 
the production system.  In Figure 1, we indicated that the obligatory processes take place 
continuously.  The key open question is what factors determine whether and when the 
optional processes take place.  But this question has not been the focus of research on 
prediction and the main conclusion we can make at this point is that the optional processes 
depend on time and resources. 
We have identified many cases in which there is no evidence that prediction-by-
production occurs. But since competent users of a language almost always manage to 
comprehend what they encounter, they must be able to do so without using prediction-by-
production.  We have therefore proposed an account that combines traditional (non-
predictive) mechanisms of incremental interpretation (e.g., Marslen-Wilson, 1973) with an 
optional mechanism that recruits the production system for prediction.   
 Good evidence that prediction-by-production requires time comes from Ito et al. 
(2016) and Wlotko and Federmeier (2015), which we discussed in section 3.1.2. In Ito et al. 
(2016), the N400 effect indexing semantic prediction occurred at presentation rates (SOAs) 
of 500ms and 700ms, but the N400 effect indexing phonological prediction occurred only at 
the slower presentation rate. Thus, slower presentation enhances prediction and specifically 
those aspects of prediction that correspond to the later stages of production. In Wlotko and 
Federmeier (2015), the N400 effect indexing semantic prediction was itself reduced at the 
faster presentation rate of 250ms, showing that even semantic prediction takes time.   
There is some evidence that prediction-by-production is resource-intensive (section 
2.4.2), with predictive eye movements being sensitive to working-memory limitations 
(Huettig & Janse, 2016) and memory load (Ito et al., 2017). An additional way to investigate 
this issue is to consider the effects of adverse listening or reading conditions on prediction. 
We might expect prediction-by-production to be used less under adverse conditions, because 
the comprehenders’ limited resources are more taxed.  But it is also possible that prediction-
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by-production might be engaged more, because it is needed more (and indeed, this possibility 
would be consistent with enhanced motor activation while listening in adverse conditions; 
Adank, 2012).  As far as we are aware, no research has directly addressed this issue. 
We propose that comprehenders predict by production whenever some aspect of the 
upcoming utterance is predictable, but only if time and resources are available.  For example, 
the comprehender hearing The boy went out to the park to fly a kite (Fig. 1) would initiate 
predictions at several points in the sentence.  Assuming sufficient resources, she would 
predict an event and a verb after The boy, but would not predict form.  After The boy went out 
to the, she would predict the semantic category of OPEN-SPACE.  After The boy went out to 
the park to fly a, she would predict the word kite, which includes all of its lexical information 
(e.g., +FLYABLE, noun, /kaIt/).  Resource and time limitations may prevent some of these 
predictions by effectively stopping the production system, for example allowing her to 
predict an event but not a verb after boy or predict +FLYABLE and noun but not /kaIt/ after 
fly a.  Overall, we expect predictions of earlier stages in production to occur more often than 
predictions of later stages (as suggested by Ito et al., 2016). 
In addition, some predictions may be ready “early,” well before the (potentially) 
corresponding input occurs.  For example, the comprehender may predict that the sentence 
will mention kite several words before it might occur (e.g., around park).  Studies have not 
typically addressed this issue, though we noted that Ito et al. (2018) found that listeners 
looked at pictures that were phonologically related to the predictable word from 500ms 
before the word onset.  Moreover, evidence that comprehenders predict turn-ends several 
hundred milliseconds before they occur (Magyari et al., 2014) also supports early prediction.  
More speculatively, the evidence that addressees prepare answers well before the end of a 
question and then produce the answer at the appropriate time (Bögels et al., 2015) suggests 
extensive overlap between comprehension and production in dialogue and is compatible with 
early prediction-by-production.  
 
Two Components to Prediction-by-Production? (4.2) 
 Throughout this review, we have assumed that prediction-by-production makes use of 
production mechanisms that are traditionally assumed in psycholinguistics (e.g., Bock & 
Levelt, 1994; Dell, 1986; Levelt, 1989).  But some theories assume that speakers predict 
aspects of what they are likely to say before they prepare the representations that underlie the 
act of speaking (Hickok, 2012; Pickering & Garrod, 2013; Tourville & Guenther, 2011).  
These theories therefore distinguish between predicted and implemented representations 
within production itself (with the implemented representations being those that are 
traditionally assumed in psycholinguistics).  If such theories are correct, then prediction-by-
production might make use of the predicted representations as well as the implemented 
representations.  Below we discuss the characteristics of these predicted representations and 
what role they might serve in prediction-by-production.   
Speakers predict what a sound or syllable they are about to articulate will sound like. 
This allows them to spot deviations from the predicted sound extremely quickly, because all 
they have to do is compare what it did sound like to what it should have sounded like 
(according to their prediction). If they match, the earliest auditory response (roughly 100ms) 
in the EEG and MEG records is reduced (e.g., Heinks-Maldonado, Nagarajan, & Houde, 
2006; see also Niziolek, Nagarajan, & Houde, 2013).  
According to computational models of speech motor control based on this evidence 
(Hickok, 2012; see also Tourville & Guenther, 2011), the speaker takes an efference copy of 
his intention to speak, runs it through a forward model of syllabic production, and rapidly 
computes the predicted percept of the syllable (i.e., what it sounds like to the speaker), before 
the syllable is implemented by the articulation system. A forward model is thus a mapping 
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between the (motor) intention to move the articulators in a certain way and the perceptual 
outcome of actually moving them. Speakers learn forward models by repeatedly performing 
an action and hence pairing the intention with the percept of the outcome, and the 
discrepancy between the predicted and actual percept drives error-based learning (Wolpert, 
1997).  Pickering and Garrod (2013) proposed that forward models are not only involved in 
the production of speech sounds, but can be computed in relation to every stage of the 
process of speaking. They directly map production-based representations onto 
comprehension-based representations and could therefore serve as extremely flexible and fast 
prediction-by-production mechanisms that speed up the process of comparing predictions to 
the input by generating predictions that are already in a format comparable to the input. 
We have discussed three groups of studies that provide some evidence for the use of 
forward models in prediction.  The first is Dikker et al. (2010), who found that the M100 
response generated in visual cortex was enhanced when the visual form of a word was 
atypical for a word of a predictable syntactic category (section 2.1.3).  In other words, the 
syntactic context led to a prediction of visual form that was compared to the perceived visual 
form.  This requires a mechanism to convert an abstract (non-sensory) prediction into a 
sensory format. If comprehenders predict by production, they need to map from a production-
based to a comprehension-based representation.  As illustrated above, this is precisely the 
function that forward models serve in language production, and it may be that they serve the 
same function during prediction in language comprehension too. 
Second, we noted arguments that readers plan eye-movements before lexical access is 
completed, but that these plans are nevertheless affected by word frequency (Reichle et al., 
1998; Engbert et al., 2005; White, 2008), which suggests that readers predict word frequency 
(section 3.2.2).  Such predictions appear to require forward modeling, as they do not depend 
on using context to predict a word and hence its frequency (as shown by Fruchter et al., 2015; 
section 3.1.1), but rather depend on the familiarity of the target word itself.  So the prediction 
must involve a mapping – a forward model – between the target word (specifically, its 
familiarity as assessed in the L1 stage) and lexical access time.  In other words, the reader 
processes a word form and predicts (based on experience with that form) how long lexical 
access will take – and then begins saccade planning before lexical access. 
Finally, there is much evidence that the cerebellum computes forward models in 
motor control (i.e., predicting the sensory consequences of movements, including speech 
movements; Tourville & Guenther, 2011).  We have noted that inhibiting the cerebellum 
disrupts prediction-by-production (Lesage et al., 2012; section 2.2).  Additionally, activation 
in the right cerebellum correlates with adaptation to distorted speech (Guediche, Holt, 
Laurent, Lim, & Fiez, 2015), which suggests that it plays a role in facilitating comprehension.  
In fact, many authors have proposed that the cerebellum computes forward models that 
support prediction during comprehension (see Moberget & Ivry, 2016).   
These arguments do not prove that comprehenders use forward models during 
prediction-by-production.  But given the strong evidence for forward models in production 
and the evidence that the other components of production are implicated in prediction, it 
would be worthwhile to directly investigate forward modeling in comprehension.  
 
What Role for Prediction-by-Association? (4.3) 
In Section 2.5, we argued that some cases of prediction are due to prediction-by-
association. In Figure 2, prediction-by-association is treated as an integral (non-optional) 
component of comprehension – it takes place whether or not the comprehender goes on to 
predict by production.  Much of the evidence for prediction-by-association comes from 
traditional priming studies, such as associative priming (D. E. Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971; 
Bentin et al., 1985).  The spreading-activation account of such studies involves prediction 
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(e.g., Lau et al., 2013), though, as we noted, a non-predictive (integration-based) account may 
be possible.  Additionally, we discussed a few studies in which comprehenders appear to 
predict-by-association and where a prediction-by-production account is not possible.  For 
example, Kukona et al. (2011) found that comprehenders look at a policeman after hearing 
Bill will arrest – the word policeman is associatively related to arrest, but is incompatible 
with covert imitation at this point and thus the comprehender would not predict it by 
production (see also Methusalem et al., 2012; Kukona et al., 2014; Sauppe, 2016; Kamide et 
al., 2003; Borovsky et al., 2012). 
These examples all involve spreading activation between representations linked in 
long-term memory.  The key question for understanding prediction-by-association is 
determining the content of these representations and the nature (i.e., number and strength) of 
the links between representations, along which activation spreads.  This amounts to a theory 
of the organization of semantic memory, and is beyond the scope of this paper. With regard 
to the content of the representations between which activation spreads, we propose that the 
starting point for prediction-by-association is the comprehension representations that also 
feed into the process of covert imitation (Figure 2). Such representations need not be limited 
to lexical semantics, and in fact our explanation of Methusalem et al. (2012) explicitly 
assumed that prediction-by-association can have more complex event representations as its 
starting point. However, we suggest the starting point for prediction-by-association is 
unlikely to incorporate the non-linguistic context and shared background knowledge, which 
are instead part of the process of deriving the intention, and thus constitute the initial stages 
of prediction-by-production.  
Prediction-by-association is of course dependent on experience: For example, 
regularly encountering queen and king (and their referents) in similar contexts creates an 
association between them (e.g., Andrews, Vigliocco, & Vinson, 2009), and the strength of 
this learned association affects prediction. Future studies should investigate how our 
experience of language and the world shapes our prediction. A recent example of this line of 
research is Borovsky (2016), who investigated how much experience of novel events (e.g., 
the monkey is riding the bus) is necessary before comprehenders begin to generate 
predictions based on combining the meaning of agent and the verb (similarly to Borovsky et 
al., 2014, see section 3.6.2): Findings from two visual-world studies showed that people look 
at predictable patients before they encounter them, but only after being exposed to the novel 
events (with the same agents) more than once. 
In addition, a large literature addresses the question of how people learn regularities in 
the order of syntactic categories (e.g., that nouns tend to follow determiners in English) and 
sounds (so called phonotactic constraints; e.g., in Italian /st/ must be followed by either a 
vowel or /r/). Infants can acquire such patterns easily (e.g., Mintz, 2003; Saffran, 2003; 
Mattys & Jusczyk, 2001), and adults and children learn new (artificially created) patterns by 
simple exposure (e.g., Gómez & Gerken, 2000; Saffran, 2001; Misyak, Christiansen, & Bruce 
Tomblin, 2010; Pozzan & Trueswell, 2015), including patterns that involve nonadjacent 
dependencies (e.g., Newport & Aslin, 2004; Gómez, 2002; Misyak & Christiansen, 2007).  
The nature of such (statistical) learning mechanisms is not well understood, but they are 
likely not specific to language (e.g., Kirkham, Slemmer, & Johnson, 2002; Thiessen, 2011; 
Conway, Bauernschmidt, Huang, & Pisoni, 2010).  People may use these learned regularities 
to make predictions, in which case they would be using prediction-by-association. However, 
the extent to which these regularities drive prediction is not clear (Dale, Duran, & Morehead, 
2012).  In sum, prediction-by-association potentially plays a ubiquitous role during 
comprehension. But as we have noted in section 1.5, its role in supporting comprehension is 
limited because it is also undirected and short-lived. 
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Effects of Disconfirming Predictions (4.4) 
 What happens when a prediction is incorrect? This is an important question, but we 
have not made it a focus of our paper because the answer is still unclear. Here we briefly 
discuss the little available evidence. In many areas of language comprehension (e.g., garden-
paths; Bever, 1970), misanalysis leads to difficulty, and we might similarly expect difficulty 
following an incorrect prediction.  But there is very little evidence that making a wrong 
prediction causes comprehenders to read more slowly or make more regressive eye-
movements, compared to making no prediction at all. In particular, words do not appear to be 
harder to process when they follow a context that is strongly predictive of a different word 
versus a context that is not strongly predictive of a different word.  For example, Luke and 
Christianson (2016) found no evidence of prediction costs in a large-scale reading study.  
They considered all words with Cloze values below 50% and found that their difficulty did 
not depend on the Cloze value of the most predictable alternative word given that context.  
Frisson, Harvey, and Staub (2017) found similar reading times for an unpredictable word in a 
context that predicted a different word versus a context that predicted no specific word 
(though reading times for the predicted word itself were of course shorter; see Staub, 2015).  
Finally, Traxler and Foss (2000) found that a predictive context had the same effect on target 
word naming whether the context also predicted another word to a similar extent or did not.  
All of these findings suggest that recovering from an incorrect prediction does not tend to 
cause difficulty.  
Moreover, it is possible that comprehending a word should actually be easier rather 
than harder when it follows a context that strongly predicts a different word versus a context 
that does not strongly predict a different word.  In a timed Cloze task, Staub et al. (2015) 
found that participants were faster producing a completion with a given Cloze probability in a 
higher-constraint context than a completion with the same Cloze probability in a lower-
constraint context, and showed how this result was compatible with a race-based model in 
which the activation levels of alternative completions are independent.  An equivalent model 
for prediction during comprehension would therefore actually claim an advantage for a failed 
prediction rather than a cost.  
Note that ERP studies demonstrate effects of having a more predictable alternative 
word.  For example, Federmeier et al. (2007) found that unpredictable words evoked a larger 
anterior positivity following a context that strongly predicted a different word versus a 
context that did not strongly predict any word (see Van Petten & Luka, 2012).  Brothers, 
Swaab, and Traxler (2015) also showed a larger anterior positivity when participants reported 
not having predicted the target word than when they reported having predicted it. 
Interestingly, this positivity was elicited by unpredicted targets in sentences with 
comparatively low Cloze values. 
In sum, there are effects associated with making the wrong prediction, but they may 
not reflect costs. Note that most researchers (e.g., Luke & Christianson, 2016; Van Petten & 
Luka, 2012) assume that wrong predictions should lead to costs only when such predictions 
are detailed enough to pre-activate a specific lexical item, which would then compete with 
activation of alternative words. Instead, if comprehenders predict sets of words, then these 
researchers assume that costs should be much less likely, perhaps because more words would 
be compatible with what is predicted. In addition, Staub et al. (2015) found that completions 
were produced faster when they had a closer semantic relationship to the most likely 
completion (see also Roland, Yun, Koenig, & Mauner, 2012), and this facilitatory effect of 
semantic relatedness was larger after more predictive sentence contexts (though cf. 
Kleinman, Runnqvist, & Ferreira, 2015).  
Staub et al.’s (2015) conclusions are compatible with prediction-by-production. At the 
semantic level, comprehenders typically pre-activate a large set of related concepts in 
 57 
parallel, and this broad activation might explain the facilitatory effect of semantic relatedness. 
But as the comprehender proceeds further through the stages of prediction-by-production, 
pre-activation becomes increasingly focussed on fewer and fewer alternatives (and ultimately 
a single alternative). This may result in alternatives losing activation and therefore could 
cause a processing load if one of these abandoned alternatives ends up being the one that is 
actually encountered by the comprehender. In sum, the staged nature of prediction-by-
production means that there might be both benefits and costs to disconfirmed predictions.  
Overall, more detailed research is needed to determine the effects of disconfirmed 
predictions.  At the moment, most evidence seems to suggest that are no costs associated with 
disconfirmed predictions (though the ERP studies show that the brain registers when a 
prediction is disconfirmed). This is perhaps surprising but it can be argued to motivate 
prediction.  The benefit of successful prediction is that pre-activation of representations 
facilitates subsequent bottom-up processing (see section 1.2).  If unsuccessful predictions are 
not costly, then comprehenders who can predict may as well do so. 
 
Methodological Implications (4.5) 
 Most research suggests that Cloze tests accurately measure predictability and their 
results are closely related to actual prediction.  But why should this be the case?  In Cloze 
tests, participants engage their production systems to complete the sentence fragments.  In 
other words, they simply engage the same processes used in prediction-by-production but 
actually produce the predicted word.  In fact, Staub et al. (2015) found that participants 
produced high-Cloze words more quickly than low-Cloze words (both when comparing 
higher- and lower-constraint contexts and when comparing completions to the same context), 
a finding which is consistent with prediction-by-production. 
 Researchers often raise concerns that experiments that involve slow presentation rates  
may not reflect “normal” processing.  Our proposals give a clear basis for this intuition.  The 
stages involved in prediction-by-production take a similar amount of time to the equivalent 
stages in language production (e.g., Indefrey & Levelt, 2004).  So a slow presentation rate 
(e.g., 700ms/word in an ERP study; Ito et al., 2016) or slow speech (e.g., Altmann & Kamide, 
1999) allows comprehenders to engage their production systems extensively in making 
predictions.  Comparable processes may not occur in skilled reading or everyday speech 
comprehension, as they proceed at a faster rate.  The results from comprehension at slow 
presentation rates may thus not be representative of other forms of comprehension, and 
differences will be particularly apparent in late stages of production, such as phonology, as 
the comprehender may not have time to make the relevant predictions. 
 
Conclusions (5.) 
Comprehenders regularly predict different aspects of what they are likely to encounter 
– specific words, aspects of meaning, grammar, and sound.  To do this, they use general-
purpose associative mechanisms, which are ubiquitous but not usually very effective.  But by 
far the most important route to prediction involves the production system, so that 
comprehenders predict using the mechanisms that they would use if they took over the role of 
speaker at this point – as they do in natural dialogue and in Cloze tasks.  Prediction-by-
production is highly accurate and effective (unlike prediction-by-association) but does not 
occur all the time and is not necessary for successful comprehension.  Instead, it is a very 
important but optional mechanism that helps comprehenders achieve their goals of rapid and 
robust understanding of speeches, texts, and conversations. 
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